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“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise in-
famous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury . . . .”1 
  INTRODUCTION   
Every day, defendants in federal courts waive grand jury 
indictment, usually in the process of pleading guilty. Waiver of 
indictment, permitted by Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure (FRCP) since 1946, enhances the efficiency of the 
federal criminal process by facilitating and expediting guilty 
pleas and the commencement of sentences, by preserving court 
and prosecutorial resources, and by permitting defendants to 
use their willingness to forgo grand jury indictment as leverage 
when plea bargaining. Waiver of adjudicatory criminal proce-
dural rights typically promotes the efficient adjudication of 
guilt and produces practical benefits for the court system, the 
government, and, in some cases, the individual defendant. Fur-
thermore, because such rights usually are understood to be in 
the manner of a personal privilege of the defendant rather than 
a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the court, waiver generally 
is deemed proper from a constitutional standpoint. 
However, the dominant view in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries acknowledged a nexus between the Fifth 
Amendment right to grand jury indictment and a federal 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a criminal matter. In fact, a 
valid grand jury indictment was thought to be a prerequisite to 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, a federal 
defendant could not waive or forfeit the right to grand jury in-
dictment for an infamous crime, because without an indictment 
a federal court had no jurisdiction over a criminal case. 
Although federal courts for the first 150 years of U.S. con-
stitutional history viewed the right to grand jury indictment as 
having jurisdictional significance, the promulgation of the con-
troversial provision for waiver of grand jury indictment in Rule 
7 of the 1946 FRCP reflected the view that the right to grand 
jury indictment is just another waivable criminal procedural 
right, unrelated to a court’s power to hear a case. This modern 
view was recently affirmed by the Supreme Court.2  
The shift in judicial understanding about the relationship 
of grand jury indictment and jurisdiction came about not as the 
result of a constitutional amendment or a novel interpretation 
by the Supreme Court of the Grand Jury Clause; the rejection 
of the jurisdictional significance of the grand jury is, at bottom, 
the direct result of the rejection of formalist and mechanical 
approaches to criminal procedure during a larger project of 
criminal law reform in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The reformers saw the grand jury as an ineffective 
protector of individual liberty and, more importantly, as an un-
necessary obstacle to the procedural efficiency to which they 
aspired. 
Placing practical concerns at the forefront, these reformers 
were able to obscure the “jurisdictional heritage” of the grand 
jury and push through—over serious constitutional objections—
a provision for waiver of grand jury indictment as part of the 
promulgation of the FRCP. Rule 7’s waiver provision seemingly 
achieved the goal of efficiency, but it did so without full consid-
eration of the role the Grand Jury Clause might play in the 
constitutional framework governing criminal cases. However, a 
half century later, Apprendi v. New Jersey3 and its progeny 
prompted a more granular analysis of the function of grand 
jury indictment in the framework of criminal procedural rights. 
In the process, the serious flaws of the modern understanding 
of the grand jury were laid bare. 
This Article recovers the jurisdictional heritage of the 
grand jury and argues that the modern understanding is con-
tradicted by the weight of the compelling and, thus far, largely 
 
 2. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002). 
 3. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
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ignored historical evidence of the grand jury’s jurisdictional 
significance. The modern view undervalues the rich history of 
the nexus between grand jury indictment and subject matter 
jurisdiction in federal criminal cases as a result of the legal re-
alist procedural reform project of the early twentieth century 
and its failure to reconcile its pragmatic view of the grand jury 
requirement with the jurisdictional heritage of the Grand Jury 
Clause. To this day, there has been no considered judgment re-
garding what the jurisdictional significance of the grand jury 
might mean for the protection of individual liberty. In short, 
the reformers made short shrift of the jurisdictional heritage of 
the grand jury and the Supreme Court, relying on flawed legal 
and historical analysis, has failed to correct the course. As a re-
sult, we remain frustrated in our understanding of the proper 
role of the grand jury in the constitutional design. 
Part I of the Article previews the central arguments mili-
tating against the jurisdictional import of the grand jury, some 
of which were recently endorsed by the Supreme Court. Part II 
argues that the federal grand jury indeed boasts a “jurisdic-
tional heritage” worthy of acknowledgement as we consider the 
contours of the continuing role of the grand jury in the struc-
ture of the U.S. Constitution. After a brief treatment of the ori-
gins, history, and development of the grand jury in the United 
States, Part II examines case law and contemporary commen-
tary demonstrating that a grand jury indictment was, for the 
first 150 years of our constitutional history, a mandatory pre-
requisite to a federal trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a 
criminal case. Part II also defends this jurisdictional heritage 
against the modern pragmatic critique that dismisses the ju-
risdictional significance of the grand jury. 
Part III examines the criminal procedural reform project of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which 
showed little respect for the jurisdictional heritage of the grand 
jury. These reformers, who shared significant philosophical 
common ground with the legal realists, sought to discard the 
formalism of the English and nineteenth century American ap-
proaches to the initiation and adjudication of criminal cases, 
and targeted the institution of the grand jury for reform and 
even abolition. This campaign for functionalism over formalism 
in criminal procedure planted the seeds for the drafting and 
adoption—despite serious constitutional concerns—of the 1946 
FRCP’s provision for waiver of indictment in federal criminal 
cases. Part III concludes that the legal realist criminal proce-
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dural reform project of the early twentieth century, with its at-
tack on the inefficiency and formalism, may have subverted the 
mandate of the Grand Jury Clause. 
These successful efforts to promulgate a waiver provision, 
as Part IV explains, may have been undertaken for wholly le-
gitimate and desirable policy purposes, but they failed to satis-
factorily address serious doubts raised regarding the constitu-
tionality of the indictment waiver. As a result, the questions of 
jurisdictional significance of the grand jury remained and con-
tinued to confound courts into the twenty-first century. The re-
sult is the weakly supported consensus at which we have ar-
rived today—one that is flawed, uninformed by the historical 
evidence, and vulnerable to future constitutional challenges 
with respect to important procedural efficiency tools such as 
pre-indictment plea bargaining. After highlighting the implica-
tions of this uncertainty and contextualizing them within the 
broader discussion of the role of pragmatism and originalism in 
criminal procedure jurisprudence, Part IV discusses the ways 
in which an earnest assessment of the grand jury’s jurisdic-
tional heritage may help us to transform the modern grand jury 
into a more efficacious protection of liberty. 
The Article concludes with a call for work on a new theory 
of the relationship between the right to grand jury indictment 
and the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction—one that bal-
ances important constitutional and practical considerations by 
both acknowledging the “jurisdictional heritage” of grand jury 
indictment and allowing for efficiency-promoting tools such as 
waiver of indictment. 
I.  THE MODERN REJECTION OF THE GRAND JURY’S 
JURISDICTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE   
If the existence of a valid grand jury indictment were a 
mandatory, non-waivable prerequisite to a federal district 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a (felony) criminal case, 
then the absence of a valid grand jury indictment would de-
prive a district court of jurisdiction over the case. This result 
would follow regardless of whether the defendant waives the 
right to indictment, an indictment is never found by a grand 
jury, or the indictment is fatally defective in some way.4 The 
 
 4. Indictment defects can take a number of forms, ranging from failure to 
provide notice of charges as required by the Sixth Amendment to the failure of 
the indictment to reflect the Fifth Amendment due process “screening” func-
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Supreme Court, in United States v. Cotton, recently rejected the 
aforementioned premise that there is a relationship between 
grand jury indictment and federal criminal jurisdiction.5 In so 
doing, the Court revealed some of the central misunderstand-
ings at the core of the question of whether the federal grand 
jury boasts a jurisdictional heritage. 
Just prior to Cotton, the watershed case of Apprendi v. New 
Jersey6 helped to expose a fault line in our understanding of the 
relationship of grand jury indictment and jurisdiction. In Ap-
prendi, the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the 
punishment for a crime in a way that exceeds the statutory 
maximum for that crime must be charged in the indictment 
and determined by the fact-finder beyond a reasonable doubt.7 
This monumental ruling led to challenges by defendants con-
victed of federal crimes for which they received an enhanced 
sentence based on a sentencing judge’s determination, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s conduct 
qualified in some way for an enhancement under the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines or a statutory provision.8 
 
tion that the grand jury alone is meant to perform (e.g., where a court alters 
an indictment at trial in some material way). Benjamin E. Rosenberg, The 
Analysis of Defective Indictments After United States v. Cotton, 41 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 463, 463, 465–66 (2005). For purposes of this Article, regardless of the 
type of defect, when courts treat the flaw as rendering the purported indict-
ment a nullity, the defect is fatal. Cf. Peter G. Ballou, “Jurisdictional” Indict-
ments, Informations and Complaints: An Unnecessary Doctrine, 29 ME. L. REV. 
1, 21 (1977) (reflecting the assumption that “failure of an indictment to charge 
an offense is the equivalent of no indictment at all”). 
 5. 535 U.S. at 631. 
 6. 530 U.S. 466. 
 7. Id. at 490. 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005); Blakely 
v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (2004). Blakely extended the Apprendi 
rule to the statutory guidelines context, holding that the Sixth Amendment 
requires that juries—not judges—must find facts necessary to impose an en-
hanced sentence, even if the sentence remains within the statutory maximum. 
See id. at 2537–38. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court extended the 
Blakely reasoning to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see Booker, 125 S. Ct. 
at 751, but saved the Guidelines by severing the provisions that had made 
them mandatory and by setting forth standards of review on appeal. See id. at 
755–56, 764; see also Craig Green, Booker and Fanfan: The Untimely Death 
(and Rebirth?) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 93 GEO. L.J. 395, 395 
(2005) (describing the Court’s rejection of mandatory use of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines); David Yellen, Saving Federal Sentencing After Apprendi, 
Blakely, and Booker, 50 VILL. L. REV. 163, 163–64 (2005) (detailing the Ap-
prendi line of cases). As a result, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines remain, 
but are advisory. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756–67. 
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One such challenge came in Cotton. Cotton, along with 
seven others, was indicted for and convicted of a single count of 
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base.9 Neither the indict-
ment nor the verdict form specified a particular quantity of 
narcotics to be attributed to the conspiracy or the various co-
conspirators.10 However, based on its finding, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, regarding various quantities of cocaine 
base attributed to each co-conspirator, the district court sen-
tenced Cotton and six of his seven co-conspirators to a term of 
imprisonment greater than the twenty year maximum penalty 
provided for when there exists “an unspecified quantity” of co-
caine base.11 Cotton and the others appealed on a number of 
grounds, including the argument that because a specific 
threshold drug quantity was neither alleged in the indictment 
nor found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the enhanced 
sentence punished them for a crime with which they were nei-
ther charged nor convicted, in violation of Apprendi.12 
The Fourth Circuit agreed, holding that “the district court 
exceeded its jurisdiction in sentencing the appellants for a 
crime with which they were never charged, thus depriving 
them of the constitutional right to ‘answer’ only for those 
crimes presented to the grand jury.”13 The court explained that 
“because an indictment setting forth all the essential elements 
of an offense is both mandatory and jurisdictional, and a ‘de-
fendant cannot be “held to answer” for any offense not charged 
in an indictment returned by a grand jury,’ a court is without 
 
 9. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 627–28. 
 10. Id. at 628. 
 11. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2000). Cotton and four of his co-
conspirators had over 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base attributed to them and, 
thus, were sentenced to life imprisonment. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 628. Two other 
co-conspirators received sentences of thirty years imprisonment. Id. In impos-
ing these sentences, the district court relied on 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), 
which allows for a maximum sentence of life in prison for offenses involving 
fifty grams or more of cocaine base. Id. However, for offenses involving un-
specified quantities of cocaine base, the maximum penalty is twenty years. 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); Cotton, 535 U.S. at 628. 
 12. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 624–25. 
 13. United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 405 (4th Cir. 2001); see also id. 
at 404 (“[W]hen an indictment fails to set forth an ‘essential element of a 
crime,’ ‘[t]he court . . . ha[s] no jurisdiction to try [a defendant] under that 
count of the indictment.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225, 1232–33 (4th Cir. 1988))). 
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‘jurisdiction to . . . impose a sentence for an offense not charged 
in the indictment.’”14 
The Supreme Court reversed.15 Rejecting the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s view, the Court held that a defective indictment does not 
deprive a court of jurisdiction.16 The Court explained that the 
Fourth Circuit view had originated in the nineteenth century 
case of Ex parte Bain,17 in which the Court granted a peti-
tioner’s writ of habeas corpus on the ground that an allegation 
had been stricken from the indictment, thus depriving the court 
of jurisdiction over the matter.18 Although the grand jury had 
returned an indictment against the defendant, the alteration of 
that charging document by the trial court rendered that in-
dictment a nullity—as if it had never existed—and, therefore, 
the Bain Court reasoned, the trial court no longer had jurisdic-
tion over the matter.19 
The Cotton Court explained that the Bain decision arose in 
an era in which the Supreme Court had relatively little author-
ity to review criminal convictions.20 In 1887, the Court could 
only review a criminal conviction pursuant to a writ of habeas 
corpus and, then, only when the court of conviction had no ju-
risdiction over the matter.21 This narrow ability to review 
criminal convictions only on habeas review and only for juris-
dictional defects led the Bain Court to adopt, what Cotton de-
scribed as, “a ‘somewhat expansive notion of jurisdiction,’”22 
which “was ‘more a fiction than anything else.’”23 According to 
the Cotton Court, “Bain’s elastic concept of jurisdiction is not 
what the term ‘jurisdiction’ means today, i.e., ‘the court’s statu-
tory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.’”24 
 
 14. Id. at 404–05 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Tran, 
234 F.3d 798, 808 (2d Cir. 2000)). The court also found that the failure to 
charge the drug quantity in the indictment satisfied the plain error standard. 
See id. at 406–07. 
 15. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 634. 
 16. See id. at 631. 
 17. 121 U.S. 1 (1887), overruled by Cotton, 535 U.S. 625. 
 18. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631. 
 19. See Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 13 (“[T]he jurisdiction of the offence 
[was] gone, and the court [had] no right to proceed any further in the progress 
of the case for want of an indictment.”). 
 20. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629. 
 21. Id. at 629–30. 
 22. Id. at 630 (quoting Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 494 (1994)). 
 23. Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977)). 
 24. Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 
(1998)). The Court pointed out that subject-matter jurisdiction “can never be 
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Analyzing selected post-Bain twentieth century cases, the 
Court concluded that “defects in an indictment do not deprive a 
court of its power to adjudicate a case,”25 and, “[i]nsofar as it 
held that a defective indictment deprives a court of jurisdiction, 
Bain is overruled.”26 The Cotton Court also contrasted “subject-
matter jurisdiction,” which “involves a court’s power to hear a 
case” and “can never be forfeited or waived,” with the “grand 
jury right,” which “can be waived.”27 Notably, the Court did not 
advance a rationale for the constitutionality of waiver of grand 
jury indictment.28 
 
forfeited or waived” and, therefore, “defects in subject-matter jurisdiction re-
quire correction regardless of whether the error was raised in district court.” 
Id. (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)). The 
Court contrasted subject-matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived, with the 
grand jury right, which can be waived. Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b); Smith 
v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 6 (1959)). 
 25. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631. The cases the courts cited for this proposition, 
United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951), and Lamar v. United States, 240 
U.S. 60 (1916), do not ultimately support this position. In Williams, the ques-
tion was whether a defendant could be convicted of perjury when the alleged 
false statement took place before a court entertaining a faulty indictment. 341 
U.S. at 61. There, the Court’s discussion was highly contextual and chiefly 
concerned with whether a perjury defendant would be able to escape criminal 
liability by collaterally challenging the jurisdiction of the court before which 
he or she lied. Id. at 65. Aside from the fact that the Court was dealing with 
murky and context-specific questions, the analysis in no way touched upon the 
impact on a court’s jurisdiction where there is no indictment at all. See id. at 
65–69. Likewise, in Lamar, the Court’s analysis focused on the distinct ques-
tion of whether an objection to an indictment on the grounds that it does not 
charge a crime is an issue of merits or jurisdiction. 240 U.S. at 64. These cases 
do not counter the principle set forth in Ex parte Bain that a grand jury in-
dictment is a mandatory prerequisite to a federal court’s exercise of jurisdic-
tion in a criminal case. See Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 13 (1887), overruled by 
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002). 
 26. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631. The Court went on to hold that the failure of 
the indictment to allege a specific drug quantity did not meet the plain error 
test. Id. at 633–34. 
 27. Id. at 630 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b); Smith v. United States, 360 
U.S. 1, 6 (1959)). 
 28. The Court cited only FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b), the rule allowing for waiver 
of indictment, and Smith, 360 U.S. 1, for the proposition that the right to 
grand jury indictment may be waived. Rule 7(b) was promulgated over serious 
constitutional objections that the rulemakers failed to answer. See infra Part 
III. The Smith Court advanced no constitutional rationale for waiver of in-
dictment in the face of the jurisdictional mandate of the Grand Jury Clause, 
but rather relied on district court and circuit court opinions construing Rule 
7(a) to allow for waiver in non-capital cases. 360 U.S. at 6–9. Missing from this 
waiver analysis is any rebuttal of the nineteenth century view that grand jury 
indictment is a mandatory prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction—a con-
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Whether due to misconstruction or legerdemain, the Su-
preme Court in Cotton squandered an opportunity to clarify the 
relationship between grand jury indictment and jurisdiction. To 
be sure, the Cotton decision was chiefly focused on the question 
of whether an Apprendi error in an indictment gave rise to a 
jurisdictional defect sufficient to satisfy plain error review.29 
However, the Court, of necessity, also made certain observa-
tions about the relationship of grand jury indictment and juris-
diction beyond that narrow question.30 Two distinct statements 
germane to the question of whether there is a relationship be-
tween grand jury indictment and jurisdiction can be gleaned 
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Cotton. First, the notion 
that grand jury indictment and jurisdiction are linked is a 
nineteenth century fiction.31 Second, FRCP 7’s provision for 
waiver of indictment means that there can be no relationship 
between indictment and jurisdiction, as jurisdiction can never 
be waived.32 
Cotton is evidence that the reform movement of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries succeeded in chal-
lenging the continued usefulness of the institution of the grand 
jury and promoting, without serious constitutional scrutiny, 
what the reformers saw as practical improvements in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in the federal courts.33 The re-
formers’ success was realized despite the fact that their efforts 
surrounding the waiver provision labored against the weight of 
the historical evidence which established the jurisdictional sig-
nificance of the right to grand jury indictment.34 The failure of 
the Supreme Court to analyze fairly the “jurisdictional heri-
tage” of the grand jury works a disservice to an accurate as-
sessment of the proper place of the grand jury in our constitu-
tional structure, and to long overdue efforts to fashion much-
needed improvements to the federal grand jury. 
 
straint on the court’s jurisdiction that could not be defeated by consent of the 
defendant. See id. at 6–10.  
 29. See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, To Err Is Human: The Judicial Co-
nundrum of Curing Apprendi Error, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 889, 921–26 (2003). 
 30. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629–31. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 630. 
 33. For a description of the reform movement, see infra Part III. 
 34. See infra Part II.B–C. 
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II.  RECOVERING THE JURISDICTIONAL HERITAGE OF 
THE GRAND JURY   
An examination of the early understanding of the grand 
jury’s role in our constitutional system yields a much different 
picture than that painted by the Court in Cotton. There can be 
no denying that the grand jury is an institution rich in jurisdic-
tional significance. Indeed, grand jury indictment, for the first 
century and a half of U.S. constitutional history, was a manda-
tory prerequisite to a federal trial court’s exercise of jurisdic-
tion in a criminal case; without a valid grand jury indictment, 
there was no felony criminal case for a federal court to enter-
tain. 
A. LESSONS FROM ENGLAND AND THE FOUNDING 
The right to grand jury indictment in federal felony crimi-
nal prosecutions flows from the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution.35 However, the grand jury it-
self, “rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history,”36 is 
“an ancient institution of the common law,”37 the heritage of 
which may go back as far as Athens,38 but safely can be traced 
back to the fourteenth century reign of Edward III, when “the 
modern practice of returning a panel of twenty-four men to in-
quire for the county was established and the body then received 
the name ‘le graunde inquest.’”39 During the first three centu-
 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capi-
tal, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury. . . .”). For a broad introduction to the history, role, and function of 
the grand jury, see SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE 
(2d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2005). 
 36. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (quoting Hannah v. 
Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 490 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result)). 
 37. United States v. Gill, 55 F.2d 399, 400 (D.N.M. 1931) (citing 4 BLACK-
STONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (Rothman Reprints 1969) (1803); Charge to 
Grand Jury, 2 Sawy. 667 (1872), reprinted in 30 Fed. Cas. 992 (1897)). 
 38. GEORGE J. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY: AN ESSAY 1 (1906). 
 39. Id. at 2. Two centuries prior, Henry II’s reign was responsible for the 
Constitutions of Clarendon and the Assize of Clarendon. M.M. KNAPPEN, CON-
STITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 185–86 (1942); Ric Simmons, 
Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal 
Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2002). These documents laid the 
groundwork for what would become the grand jury. See id. at 5. The Constitu-
tions of Clarendon (1164) offered to a layperson who was being charged in an 
ecclesiastical court the protection of a state-governed “accusing jury” when no 
public accuser had made charges against him or her. Id. at 4. This provision 
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ries of the grand jury’s use in England, it served largely the in-
terests of the monarchy,40 although by the seventeenth century 
English grand juries had begun to stand between the Crown 
and accused subjects as a protection against unwarranted ac-
cusation.41 Eventually, the law required a valid indictment by a 
grand jury before a court could try a defendant for certain 
classes of crime.42 English history demonstrates that the grand 
jury was transformed from merely an arm of the Crown into a 
protector of individual liberty. Absent a grand jury indictment, 
English courts were powerless to try a defendant for certain se-
rious crimes, irrespective of the wishes of the Crown.43 
The grand jury institution followed the English common 
law to the American colonies and quickly established itself as a 
 
was designed to stem the common practice of bringing a layperson before an 
ecclesiastical court based solely on a secret, private accusation. Id. at 4 n.9. 
Here, the layperson was afforded in certain situations “twelve lawful men of 
the neighborhood or the town to swear in the presence of the bishop, that they 
will make manifest the truth in the matter, according to their conscience.” 
Constitutions of Clarendon, ch. 6, reprinted in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENG-
LISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 11, 12 (George B. Adams & H. Morse Stephens 
eds., 1920). The Assize of Clarendon (1166) established a purely accusatory 
body comprised of twelve men out of every one-hundred in a particular town, 
who were selected to reveal, under oath, whether any local residents had 
committed a crime. EDWARDS, supra note 38, at 7. The accused individuals 
were said to be “presented” by the accusatory jury for trial on the accusations. 
See id.; JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS IN ENGLAND AND EUROPE, 1200–1700, at 9 (Mau-
reen Mulholland & Brian Pullan eds., 2003). 
 40. See Simmons, supra note 39, at 6. 
 41. A commonly cited example of this phenomenon can be found in certain 
grand juries’ refusal to indict in cases brought against Stephen Colledge and 
Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury. See EDWARDS, supra note 38, 
at 28–30; Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: 
Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1996); 
Simmons, supra note 39, at 8. 
 42. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 
90–92 (2003); BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROB-
ABLE CAUSE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 91 (1991); see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 556 (1884) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (observing that by the time the American colonies 
were established, there existed “‘an informing and accusing tribunal [ . . .], 
without whose previous action no person charged with a felony could, except in 
certain special cases, be put upon his trial’” (quoting Charge to Grand Jury, 30 
F. Cas. 992, 993 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872)) (alteration in original)). 
 43. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“If a man were 
to commit a capital offense in the face of all the judges of England, their 
united authority could not put him upon his trial . . . .”) (citation omitted)); see 
also Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 423 (1885) (“By the law of England, infor-
mations by the Attorney General without the intervention of a grand jury 
were not allowed . . . .”). 
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buffer between the colonists and the King.44 The grand jury in-
dictment was not only a prerequisite to serious criminal 
charges in many colonies, but the grand jury was woven into 
the fabric of everyday colonial life.45 Colonial grand juries also 
played a part in expressing colonists’ dissatisfaction with the 
exercise of monarchical power by nullifying attempted prosecu-
tions of critics of the Crown and aggressively issuing “angry 
and well-publicized presentments and indictments”46 against 
representatives of the Crown.47 
The role of the grand jury in the colonies gave it “enhanced 
prestige”48 and special respect among American colonists dur-
ing the pre-Revolution period. After the Revolution, the colo-
nists remained aware of the power and potential threat posed 
by any central governing authority.49 As a result, the right to 
indictment by grand jury was a topic of discussion among 
 
 44. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHT OF MANKIND: A HISTORY 
OF THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 24 (1992) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, THE 
GREAT RIGHT]; Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community: A Case for 
Grand Jury Independence, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 67, 70 (1995). Although the 
earliest colonial grand jury was established in 1635, Kadish, supra note 41, at 
9, probably the first mention of the grand jury right in the American colonial 
experience can be found in the 1683 New York Charter of Libertyes and 
Priviledges. See 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 163 (1971). The Charter, which was passed by the first elected as-
sembly of the colony of New York, provided that “[i]n all Cases Capitall or 
Criminall there shall be a grand Inquest who shall first present the offence.” 
Id. at 166. 
 45. In addition to performing the traditional accusatory function, colonial 
grand juries often addressed matters of local concern including overseeing 
community infrastructure and public works projects, taxing and spending, and 
the appointment of individuals to local office. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS 
OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 221–23 (1999); Kadish, supra note 41, at 10–11; Sim-
mons, supra note 39, at 10–11. 
 46. Renée B. Lettow, Note, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 
103 YALE L.J. 1333, 1337 (1994). 
 47. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECON-
STRUCTION 84–86 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS]; Kadish, supra 
note 41, at 11. 
 48. Lettow, supra note 46, at 1337; see also SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHT, 
supra note 44, at 76–77 (noting that North Carolina Declaration of Rights, 
adopted in 1776, contained a guarantee of right to indictment and, thus, was 
the “direct precursor” to the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause); H.L. 
McClintock, Indictment by a Grand Jury, 26 MINN. L. REV. 153, 156 (1942). 
 49. See SUSAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G. LOCKHART, FEDERAL GRAND 
JURY PRACTICE § 2.1, at 4–6 (1996); LEROY D. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY: THE 
USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL POWER 19–20 (1975); Simmons, supra note 39, 
at 12–13. 
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states deliberating the ratification of the Constitution.50 Ratify-
ing conventions from such influential states as Massachusetts, 
New York, and New Hampshire considered amendments to the 
newly drafted Constitution that would have established the 
right to grand jury indictment.51 
The Constitution as originally ratified, however, made no 
mention of grand juries.52 Not until the ratification of the Fifth 
Amendment in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights was the grand 
jury enshrined in the Constitution:53 “No person shall be held 
 
 50. See ALFREDO GARCIA, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE 
APPROACH 23 (2002); RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE 
GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634–1941, at 45–46 (1963) [hereinafter 
YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL]. 
 51. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, 
AND ORIGINS 278 (Neil H. Cogan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (1788) [herein-
after THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]; SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHT, supra 
note 44, at 128–29, 147–48, 157–58; YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL, supra 
note 50 at 45–46. One of the amendments proposed by the Massachusetts rati-
fying convention provided “[t]hat no person shall be tried for any Crime by 
which he may incur an infamous punishment or loss of life until he be first in-
dicted by a Grand Jury, except in such cases as may arise in the Government 
and regulation of the Land and Naval forces.” THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 218 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 
Penguin Books 1986) (1788). New Hampshire’s provision was virtually identi-
cal. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 278. New York proposed 
that “a Presentment or Indictment by a Grand Jury ought to be observed as a 
necessary preliminary to the trial of all Crimes cognizable by the Judiciary of 
the United States . . . .” Id. 
 52. See EDWARDS, supra note 38, at 32. There was a mention of indict-
ment in Article I, which explained that individuals whose conduct would sub-
ject them to impeachment might also otherwise be subject to criminal prosecu-
tion, which, it was contemplated, would be initiated by grand jury indictment. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not 
extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and 
enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the 
Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, 
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”); Adam H. Kurland, First 
Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Juris-
diction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1, 50 (1996) (“[T]he constitutional reference to ‘indict-
ment’ seemed to refer to a uniform federal criminal practice and thus neces-
sarily would presuppose the requirement of indictment by grand jury as part 
of the federal criminal process.”). 
 53. Even prior to the ratification of the Fifth Amendment, however, “fed-
eral grand juries returned criminal indictments as a matter of course,” Kur-
land, supra note 52, at 51 n.179, as evidenced by records of grand jury charges 
given by Supreme Court Justices. See id. (citing as one example David J. Katz, 
Note, Grand Jury Charges Delivered by Supreme Court Justices Riding Circuit 
During the 1790s, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1045, 1085–86 (1993)). 
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to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous54 crime, unless 
on a presentment55 or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,56 
when in actual service in time of [W]ar or public danger . . . .”57 
There is little discussion in the ratification debates regard-
ing the grand jury generally and virtually no discussion of the 
relationship of grand jury indictment to jurisdiction.58 The de-
bates surrounding the Grand Jury Clause appear to have been 
confined largely to language and style.59 
 
 54. An “infamous” crime, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, includes a 
felony (defined under former 18 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 1984) as any offense pun-
ishable by death or a term of imprisonment exceeding one year), a crime pun-
ishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary with or without hard labor (with 
certain exceptions), and a misdemeanor the punishment for which has the 
character of that of the aforementioned. See, e.g., Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 
417, 429 (1885); 1 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 121, at 518–20 (3d. ed. 1999). For 
the sake of simplicity, this Article will refer to infamous crimes for purposes of 
the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause as felonies. 
 55. As early as World War II, presentments were no longer used in federal 
criminal practice. Upon the 1944 adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the Advisory Committee explained that it had not included a pro-
cedural provision for presentments because “presentment has fallen into dis-
use in the federal courts . . . .” ADVISORY COMM. ON THE RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: SECOND PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT 26 (1944); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 178 (1997); Lettow, supra note 46. 
 56. Armed services personnel are not subject to grand jury indictment and 
trial by jury for criminal conduct but rather are subject to court martial. See 
Lee v. Madgian, 358 U.S. 228, 232–35, 241 (1959); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 
109, 114 (1895); 2 BEALE, supra note 35, § 8:1. 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 58. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 265–78; 
SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHT, supra note 44, at 167, 183–84; SHAPIRO, supra 
note 42, at 91. Interestingly, James Madison proposed that Article III, Section 
Two, which defined the limits of federal court jurisdiction, contain the provi-
sion that “presentment or indictment by a grand jury shall be an essential pre-
liminary” to a criminal case. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 
51, at 265; James Madison’s Proposals in the House of Representatives (June 
8, 1789), in GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A 
COMMENTARY app. J-1. at 318 (1995) (including selected sections of James 
Madison’s proposals to the House of Representatives on June 8, 1979). Dele-
gate Aedanus Burke of South Carolina was particularly adamant that the 
Constitution prohibit prosecutions from being initiated by information. See 
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 268, 283. 
 59. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 268, 283 (pro-
viding examples of debates over the use of terms such as “district” and “public 
danger”). 
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B. EMERGENCE OF THE JURISDICTIONAL NEXUS IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 
It did not take long after the ratification of the Fifth 
Amendment for courts to begin recognizing a nexus between 
the right to grand jury indictment enumerated in the Grand 
Jury Clause and the power of a court to entertain a criminal 
case. In the 1808 case of United States v. Hill, Chief Justice 
John Marshall, sitting as Circuit Justice, explained: 
[N]o act of [C]ongress directs grand juries, or defines their powers. By 
what authority, then, are they summoned, and whence do they derive 
their powers? The answer is, that the laws of the United States have 
erected courts which are vested with criminal jurisdiction. This juris-
diction they are bound to exercise, and it can only be exercised 
through the instrumentality of grand juries. They are, therefore, given 
by a necessary and indispensable implication. But, how far is this im-
plication necessary and indispensable? The answer is obvious. Its ne-
cessity is co-extensive with that jurisdiction to which it is essential.60 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion, though chiefly focused on 
the nature and powers of the grand jury itself, provides an 
early example of the jurisdictional significance that courts at-
tributed to the grand jury. The grand jury’s return of an in-
dictment was a prerequisite to the exercise of criminal jurisdic-
tion vested in federal courts by Congress pursuant to Article 
III.61 Thus, very early on, there was the recognition of a rela-
tionship between the grand jury indictment guarantee and the 
jurisdiction of federal courts in criminal cases. 
C. THE POST-BELLUM ERA—EX PARTE BAIN AND ITS PROGENY 
Federal criminal prosecutions were relatively rare in the 
early days of the Republic.62 Moreover, the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court to review federal criminal cases was very lim-
ited.63 It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court 
had little to say about the constitutional role of the grand jury 
until the post-bellum era,64 by which time federal courts had 
 
 60. 26 F. Cas. 315, 317 (Marshall, Circuit Judge, C.C.D. Va. 1809) (em-
phasis added). 
 61. See id. 
 62. See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 281 
(2002); Kurland, supra note 52, at 57. 
 63. See infra PartII.E. 
 64. In addition to the expansion of substantive federal criminal law by the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, prior to 1870, informations were rarely 
used to prosecute even minor, “non-infamous” offenses in federal courts. Be-
cause indictments were used universally, there was not much opportunity for 
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begun to clearly indicate their agreement with the view Chief 
Justice Marshall had taken of grand jury indictment as a man-
datory prerequisite to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. In 
Ex parte Wilson, the Supreme Court considered whether a cer-
tain punishment was “infamous” within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment.65 In doing so, the Court acknowledged that a 
conclusion in the affirmative meant that “no court of the United 
States had jurisdiction to try or punish him, except upon pre-
sentment or indictment by a grand jury.”66 Indeed, the Court in 
Wilson held that the punishment under consideration was in-
famous and, therefore, “the District Court, in holding the peti-
tioner to answer for such a crime, and sentencing him to such 
imprisonment, without indictment or presentment by a grand 
jury, exceeded its jurisdiction . . . .”67 
Two years later, in Ex parte Bain, the Court entertained a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus brought by a defendant who 
had been convicted of a federal false statement offense.68 The 
indictment charging the offense had been amended by the trial 
court striking certain “surplusage” more than a year after the 
indictment had been returned by the grand jury.69 The Court, 
after reviewing the common law heritage of the grand jury and 
crediting the fundamental individual rights protected by the 
institution,70 concluded that an indictment could not be amend-
ed by a court after it had been passed upon by the grand jury.71 
Therefore, the Court reasoned, an indictment rendered defec-
tive or void as a result of a trial court’s amendment deprived 
that court of jurisdiction.72 
 
courts to address the issue of federal court jurisdiction in the absence of an in-
dictment. See Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 7 n.3 (1927) (outlining the 
history of the use of informations during the first eighty years of the nation). 
 65. 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1885). 
 66. Id. at 422. 
 67. Id. at 429. 
 68. 121 U.S. 1 (1887), overruled by United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 
(2002). 
 69. The indictment had alleged that Bain, a bank teller, in filing a false 
report, had acted with intent to deceive “the Comptroller of the Currency and 
the agent appointed to examine the affairs” of the bank. Id. at 4. The trial 
judge, viewing the language “the comptroller of the currency and” as surplu-
sage, struck it from the indictment prior to trial. Id. at 5. 
 70. Id. at 12–13. 
 71. Id. at 13–14. 
 72. See id. at 12–13 (“We are of the opinion that an indictment found by a 
grand jury was indispensable to the power of the court to try the petitioner for 
the crime with which he was charged.”). 
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It is of no avail . . . to say that the court still has jurisdiction of the 
person and of the crime; for, though it has possession of the person, 
and would have jurisdiction of the crime, if it were properly presented 
by indictment, the jurisdiction of the offense is gone, and the court 
has no right to proceed any further in the progress of the case for 
want of an indictment. If there is nothing before the court which the 
prisoner, in the language of the constitution, can be ‘held to answer,’ 
he is then entitled to be discharged so far as the offense originally 
presented to the court by the indictment is concerned. The power of 
the court to proceed to try the prisoner is as much arrested as if the 
indictment had been dismissed or a nolle prosequi had been entered. 
There was nothing before the court on which it could hear evidence or 
pronounce sentence.73 
Following the logic of Ex parte Bain, later Supreme Court 
and lower court rulings reasoned that because an ineffective 
indictment deprived a court of jurisdiction over a criminal mat-
ter, it is a proper indictment that conveys to a federal court ju-
risdiction over a criminal matter.74 
Although the inquiry addressed in these cases most often 
centered on whether fatally defective indictments deprived a 
court of jurisdiction, in Ex parte McClusky, a United States 
Circuit Judge considered squarely the question whether a de-
fendant in a federal court may waive indictment and be prose-
cuted for an infamous crime by information.75 Citing Bain, the 
court held as follows: 
A party cannot waive a constitutional right when its effect is to give a 
court jurisdiction. The fifth amendment to the constitution, that no 
person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous 
crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, provides 
for a requisite to jurisdiction. If the crime is of such a nature that an 
indictment to warrant a prosecution of the crime is required by the 
law, the court has no jurisdiction to try without such indictment.76 
Again, grand jury indictment was seen as a mandatory prereq-
uisite to a court’s exercise of jurisdiction. 
 
 73. Id. at 13–14. 
 74. See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 221 (1888); Parkinson v. United 
States, 121 U.S. 281, 281–82 (1887); Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 
354 (1886); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1885); Ex parte McClusky, 40 
F. 71 (C.C.D. Ark. 1889); cf. United States v. McKee, 26 F. Cas. 1112, 1114 
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876) (explaining that presentment of an indictment before the 
court is the “best evidence of its existence and contents”). 
 75. 40 F. at 74. 
 76. Id. (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1; Parkinson, 121 U.S. 281). 
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D. THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The well-established rule that a valid grand jury indict-
ment was a mandatory prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdic-
tion in a federal criminal case went unchallenged as the nine-
teenth century gave way to the twentieth.77 In the 1909 case of 
Renigar v. United States, the Fourth Circuit was faced with a 
criminal case that had proceeded on an improperly filed in-
dictment.78 In explaining that the filing error meant that “no 
indictment was found or presented by a grand jury, which is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite,”79 the court cited with approval the 
following passage from a leading treatise on the indictment: 
[It] was manifestly designed and intended for the security of personal 
rights. It is an essential to the jurisdiction of the court[,] and[,] being 
a constitutional right of a party, cannot be waived by him so as to 
preclude him from subsequently setting up want of jurisdiction in the 
court to try him. A party cannot waive a constitutional right when its 
effect is to give the court jurisdiction.80 
Relying on Bain’s pronouncement that “an indictment 
found by a grand jury was indispensable to the power of the 
court to try the petitioner for the crime with which he was 
charged,”81 the court in Renigar concluded that even the argua-
bly ministerial indictment filing error in that case deprived the 
court of jurisdiction: 
This is not a question of irregularity, but of substantive law, based 
upon the direct terms of the constitutional guaranty that no man 
shall be ‘held to answer’ for an infamous offense except on an indict-
 
 77. See, e.g., Rider v. United States, 149 F. 164, 170 (8th Cir. 1906); Pe-
terson v. Keiffer, 50 F.2d 459, 460 (D.N.J. 1931); United States v. Tyler, 15 
F.2d 207, 207 (D. Del. 1926); Ex parte Rumsey, 291 F. 671, 672 (D. Kan. 1923); 
cf. Moreland v. United States, 276 F. 640, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1921) (reversing a 
conviction in the juvenile court where the sentence was over six months and 
the grand jury had not indicted the defendant). 
 78. 172 F. 646, 647–48 (4th Cir. 1909). 
 79. Id. at 655 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the next sentence of this 
passage from the decision was: “If a valid indictment can be dispensed with, so 
may that providing for a trial by a petit jury . . . .” Id. 
 80. Id. at 656 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting HOWARD 
C. JOYCE, TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING INDICTMENTS WITH FORMS § 31 
(1908) (citation omitted)). The passage continues: 
‘So[,] where there has been no presentment of [the] grand jury[,] or 
bill of indictment, the fact that a person confesse[d] in court to being 
guilty of a crime[,] which requires an indictment or presentment, con-
fers no power upon the court to sentence him to imprisonment, and he 
can only be lawfully sentenced after he has been proceeded against in 
the manner provided in the Constitution.’ 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting JOYCE, supra, § 32). 
 81. Renigar, 172 F. at 657 (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 12–13). 
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ment of a grand jury. The indictment—and that means of course a 
valid indictment found and presented according to the settled usage 
and established mode of procedure—is a prerequisite to the jurisdic-
tion of the court to try the person accused, an indispensable condition 
and requirement, the absence of which renders the proceedings not 
simply voidable, but absolutely void.82 
Further evidence of the relationship between grand jury 
indictment and jurisdiction can be found in a notable state 
case, People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, in which the New York 
Court of Appeals took up the question of whether an indictment 
can be waived by a defendant without divesting the court of ju-
risdiction.83 Although the United States Supreme Court had 
made clear in 1884 that the Grand Jury Clause is not incorpo-
rated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
States,84 the New York State Constitution in the 1920s had a 
grand jury provision virtually identical to that of the Fifth 
Amendment.85 Despite this constitutional provision, the New 
York State Legislature passed a statute providing for waiver of 
grand jury indictment.86 The law was soon challenged.87 The 
opinion of the New York court, which was joined by Chief Judge 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, was explicit in its consideration of the 
grand jury right as the root of jurisdiction in capital or felony 
cases.88 Declaring that “[c]onsent cannot give a court jurisdic-
tion,” the New York court followed the reasoning of Bain and 
McClusky in striking down the waiver provision as unconstitu-
tional.89 
 
 82. Id. (emphasis added). 
 83. 249 N.Y. 314 (1928). 
 84. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1883). 
 85. Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of New York pro-
vided that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infa-
mous crime . . . unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury. . . .” CA-
HILL’S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK 7 (James C. Cahill ed., 1923). 
 86. See N.Y. CODE CRIM PROC. § 222 (Bender 1928). 
 87. See Battista, 249 N.Y. at 317. 
 88. See id. at 319 (“Until the grand jury shall act, no court can acquire ju-
risdiction to try. In the most solemn and absolute language the Constitution 
dictates the only method by which one can be held to answer for murder, bur-
glary, arson or any other infamous crime. Without the prescribed action by a 
grand jury, all our other tribunals are powerless to proceed. Such action is the 
foundation of jurisdiction.”). 
 89. Id. at 320. As the Battista court explained, “waiver is not permitted 
where a question of jurisdiction or fundamental rights is involved and public 
injury would result.” Id. The court distinguished a “privilege, merely personal, 
[which] may be waived” from a “public fundamental right, the exercise of 
which is requisite to jurisdiction to try, condemn and punish, [which] is bind-
ing upon the individual and cannot be disregarded by him.” Id. 
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Given the similarity of the Federal Constitution’s Grand 
Jury Clause and the New York state constitutional provision 
guaranteeing grand jury indictment, as well as the high regard 
in which the New York Court of Appeals was held, the Battista 
decision would join Bain, McClusky, and Renigar as the core 
support for the proposition that a valid indictment of a grand 
jury was a prerequisite to a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
a criminal matter.90 Treatises of the era accepted this proposi-
tion as an accurate statement of constitutional principle.91 In-
deed, the view that a valid grand jury indictment was a pre-
requisite to the federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a 
criminal matter held sway up through World War II.92 Thus 
from the beginning of the nineteenth century through the first 
half of the twentieth century, the established and accepted 
view of the Grand Jury Clause was that federal criminal juris-
diction depended on the return of a valid grand jury indict-
ment. 
 
 90. Waiver of indictment is now permitted in New York. The New York 
Constitution was amended in 1973 to permit waiver of indictment in non-
capital cases with the consent of the district attorney. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, 
§ 6 (McKinney 1974). It should be noted that New York’s Battista case, be-
cause it addressed a statutory provision for waiver of indictment rather than a 
fatally defective indictment, would serve as a harbinger for how the question 
would be presented in the federal system in the 1940s as a result of the rule 
providing for waiver of indictment. 
 91. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
7 (1918) (“If the court has no jurisdiction by law to take cognizance of an of-
fense, jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon it by the defendant’s consent. 
Consent of the parties cannot supply want of jurisdiction.”); ARMISTEAD M. 
DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 65 (1928) 
(“[The Fifth Amendment] makes a presentment or an indictment by a grand 
jury an essential prerequisite in capital or infamous crimes. And so important 
is this right deemed that the accused cannot, even by express consent, waive 
the presentment or indictment.” (citing Ex parte McClusky, 40 F. 71, 74 
(C.C.D. Ark. 1889); Ex parte Bain 121 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1887), overruled by 
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002)). 
 92. See, e.g., Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26–27 (1943) 
(noting that the lack of a grand jury indictment affected the jurisdiction of the 
court); United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 622–23 (1930) (observing that an 
amendment to grand jury indictment “would oust jurisdiction of the court”); 
Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 8 (1927) (“A person may not be punished 
for a crime without a formal and sufficient accusation even if he voluntarily 
submits to the jurisdiction of the court.” (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1)); see 
also S. REP. NO. 72-201, at 2 (1932) (“For many years it was generally held 
that an indictment by a grand jury was jurisdictional; that it was indispensa-
ble to the power of a court to try a person accused of a felony, and, accordingly 
could not be waived.”). 
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There is clear evidence, therefore, that well into the twen-
tieth century, a federal district court did not have the power to 
proceed in a criminal matter unless and until a valid grand 
jury indictment was returned against a defendant. Neither for-
feiture nor voluntary waiver of the grand jury right was suffi-
cient to supply a court with jurisdiction to try or sentence a de-
fendant. 
E. WHY JURISDICTION MEANT JURISDICTION 
Despite this historical evidence, the modern understand-
ing, as expressed by the Cotton Court, is that in the unbroken 
line of authority discussed above, the Supreme Court and other 
federal and state courts neither understood nor meant what 
they wrote about the concept of jurisdiction. The reformers ar-
gued, and the Supreme Court ultimately agreed in Cotton, that 
those courts which wrote clearly and powerfully that federal 
criminal jurisdiction depended on the existence of a valid grand 
jury indictment really did not mean to say that a court had no 
power to consider a federal criminal case simply because there 
was no indictment conferring jurisdiction. This view posits that 
the nineteenth century courts were simply terming as “jurisdic-
tional” certain constitutional errors because the Supreme Court 
lacked authority to reverse a federal criminal conviction for 
non-jurisdictional errors. This reinterpretation is remarkable 
in light of the plain language of the earlier decisions and the 
unmistakable connection courts repeatedly found between a 
valid indictment and jurisdiction. 
In Cotton, the Court asserted that “Bain’s elastic concept of 
jurisdiction is not what the term ‘jurisdiction’ means today, i.e., 
‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the 
case.”93 This assertion flies in the in the face of the clear lan-
guage used in Bain and other cases. There is, in fact, no evi-
dence that Bain and other decisions treating grand jury in-
dictment as a prerequisite to “jurisdiction” were referring to 
anything but the “power” to adjudicate the case.94 
 
 93. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 
523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). 
 94. See, e.g., Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 12–13; Renigar v. United States, 
172 F. 646, 656 (4th Cir. 1909) (“‘So[,] where there has been no presentment of 
[the] grand jury[,] or bill of indictment, the fact that a person confesse[d] in 
court to being guilty of a crime[,] which requires an indictment or present-
ment, confers no power upon the court to sentence him to imprisonment . . . .’” 
(quoting JOYCE supra note 80, § 32)); People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 
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A fair review of the case law from the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries makes clear that the courts which recog-
nized that a grand jury indictment was a prerequisite to the 
exercise of jurisdiction did indeed refer to judicial power.95 In 
fact, Bain itself instructed that “an indictment found by a 
grand jury was indispensable to the power of the court to try 
the petitioner for the crime with which he was charged.”96 
Furthermore, trial and appellate courts in the second half 
of the twentieth century and even in the months prior to Cotton 
still spoke of a relationship between grand jury indictment and 
jurisdiction. Surely these contemporary courts understand 
“what the term ‘jurisdiction’ means today.”97 Yet these courts, 
which presumably comprehend the modern concept of jurisdic-
tion, relied heavily upon Bain and its progeny in concluding 
that the absence of an indictment impairs a court’s jurisdiction. 
Contrary to the view expressed by the Cotton Court and by 
other skeptics, the nineteenth century courts did, indeed, in-
tend that the absence of a grand jury indictment deprive a 
court of the power and the authority to entertain a criminal 
matter.  
Also suspect is the Cotton Court’s reasoning that Bain was 
the product of an era when, because there was no right to direct 
appeal of criminal convictions to the Supreme Court,98 the 
Court would shoehorn obvious constitutional violations into 
“jurisdictional defects”—the only type of error cognizable on 
habeas review.99 The Court’s description of Bain as a desire for 
just outcomes which produced a “‘somewhat expansive notion of 
 
N.Y. 314, 319 (1928) (“Without the prescribed action by a grand jury, all our 
other tribunals are powerless to proceed. Such action is the foundation of ju-
risdiction.”). 
 95. See supra Part II.A–D and cases cited therein. 
 96. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 12–13 (emphasis added). 
 97. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630. 
 98. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 84–101; WILLIAM F. 
DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 229 (1980). Congress 
extended direct review in the Supreme Court to capital cases in 1889 and to 
all cases involving infamous crimes in 1891. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 
26 Stat. 827; Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629–30, 630 n.1; In re Claasen, 140 U.S. 200, 
200 (1891). Lower court appellate supervision in criminal cases was estab-
lished in 1879. See SURRENCY, supra note 62, at 271 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 
1879, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354). 
 99. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629–30; Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 201–03 
(1830). 
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“jurisdiction,”’”100 that was “‘more a fiction than anything 
else’”101 is as strong a charge of judicial “activism” and expan-
sion of judicial power as is made by the Court’s most vocal crit-
ics. 
The dismissal of the grand jury’s jurisdictional heritage de-
scribed above labors not only against history, but against logic. 
If the Bain Court or any other court had deemed the right to 
grand jury not so fundamental to render denial of that right a 
jurisdictional defect, it would have been easy to say as much. 
Assuming that, as a general matter, the lack of availability of 
federal habeas review in the earlier era contributed to a 
broader understanding of “jurisdiction” for the purposes of 
avoiding unjust results,102—i.e., unremedied constitutional er-
rors in federal criminal cases—there is no reason to believe 
that the courts of the era felt that every constitutional error had 
to be remedied. If grand jury indictment were a mere technical-
ity, courts could have just said so and focused on other more 
fundamental defects in criminal proceedings. 
Indeed, the Court did treat some grand jury-related errors 
as mere technicalities. Rather than promiscuously providing re-
lief to habeas petitioners presenting grand jury-related errors, 
courts were not reluctant to deny a remedy to petitioners who 
presented errors that did not go to the real or constructive ab-
sence of a grand jury indictment.103 The Court regularly denied 
relief to petitioners who had been convicted on technically de-
fective indictments,104 but found jurisdictional error only where 
there was no indictment at all, or where there was, in effect, no 
 
 100. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630 (quoting Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 
494 (1994)). 
 101. Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977) (citations 
omitted)). 
 102. See Custis, 511 U.S. at 494; Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 79; DUKER, supra 
note 98, at 229–30; Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Ha-
beas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 470 (1963); see also 
Nancy J. King, Priceless Process: Non-Negotiable Features of Criminal Litiga-
tion, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 143–44 (1999). But see James S. Liebman, Apoca-
lypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas/Direct Review Parity, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992) (describing the history of habeas corpus review 
and scholarly opinions on the topic). 
 103. See, e.g., Breese v. United States, 226 U.S. 1, 2 (1912) (denying relief 
where an indictment was not presented by the grand jury as a body); Kaizo v. 
Henry, 211 U.S. 146, 149 (1908) (holding that an improperly constituted grand 
jury did not destroy jurisdiction); cf. Ex parte Ward, 173 U.S. 452, 456 (1899) 
(denying relief on habeas review when an unconfirmed judge presided over the 
trial). 
 104. DUKER, supra note 98, at 237–38. 
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indictment because it had been voided due to tampering or 
flawed grand jury review.105 Additionally, during the era when 
writs of error were not cognizable in the Supreme Court, the 
Court displayed recognition of that limitation on its appellate 
jurisdiction in the context of non-jurisdictional grand jury-
related errors—errors not severe enough to render an indict-
ment null.106 
Another factor supports the view that, no matter what in-
ferences one is tempted to draw from the Court’s limited ability 
to correct non-jurisdictional errors in criminal cases,107 nine-
teenth century courts were not stretching the notion of jurisdic-
tion in the context of grand jury indictment. The “jurisdic-
tional” characterization often was employed outside of the 
habeas context. Under the Cotton Court’s rationale, there 
would have been no further reason to classify an indictment er-
ror as jurisdictional for purposes of avoiding injustice after the 
advent of federal habeas relief for non-jurisdictional errors.108 
However, well after the beginning of the twentieth century, 
when habeas review began to expand to non-jurisdictional er-
rors, courts continued to characterize certain deprivations of 
the grand jury right as affecting the jurisdiction of the court.109 
 
 105. See, e.g., Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 13 (1887), overruled by Cotton, 535 
U.S. 625; Renigar v. United States, 172 F. 646, 655 (4th Cir. 1909); Ex parte 
McClusky, 40 F. 71, 76 (C.C.D. Ark. 1889). 
 106. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 140 U.S. 575, 584 (1891). 
 107. See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme 
Court and the Congress, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 367 (1983) (arguing that the Court 
has interpreted its habeas jurisdiction without sufficient deference to Con-
gress); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993) 
(critiquing “institutional competence” and “full review” models of nineteenth 
century habeas review and advancing the view that habeas jurisprudence, 
properly understood, has not been static).  
 108. Federal habeas review began to expand beyond jurisdictional errors as 
early as the late nineteenth century. E.g. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 
485, 494 (1994), By the early 1940s, the Supreme Court had “openly dis-
carded” the notion that jurisdiction was the only basis for federal habeas re-
view, which the Court recognized could be applied to lower courts’ “‘disregard 
of the constitutional rights of the accused.’” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 
79 (1977) (quoting Waley v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 101, 104–05 (1942) (per cu-
riam)). In addition, as discussed above, direct review in the Supreme Court of 
cases involving capital and infamous crimes was established in the late nine-
teenth century. See Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354. Notably, even 
after direct review of criminal cases was authorized, appellate courts contin-
ued to term certain grand jury-related errors as “jurisdictional.” See, e.g., 
Renigar, 172 F. at 655. 
 109. See, e.g., Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26–27 (1943); 
United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 622–23 (1930); United States v. Mack-
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Thus, even expanded habeas review did not alter the estab-
lished notion that a valid grand jury indictment was a prereq-
uisite to federal criminal jurisdiction in felony cases. 
There is, in short, no reason to believe that the Court said 
other than what it believed about the relationship of grand jury 
indictment and the court’s power to hear a case. An examina-
tion of the historical evidence demonstrates that attempts to 
minimize the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury are 
flawed. The nineteenth and early twentieth century courts 
treated grand jury indictment as a mandatory jurisdictional 
prerequisite, and clearly saw it as a limit on the courts’ power 
to entertain a criminal matter. Furthermore, motive does not 
explain why the courts of that era found jurisdictional error 
outside of the habeas context, and sometimes declined to find 
jurisdictional error within it. The grand jury, indeed, boasts a 
rich jurisdictional heritage established in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. 
III.  REALISM, REFORM, AND RULEMAKING:  
OBSCURING THE JURISDICTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE 
GRAND JURY FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES   
Despite the rich jurisdictional heritage of the Grand Jury 
Clause, the view subsequently emerged that the right to grand 
jury indictment is just another criminal procedural right—
unrelated to a court’s power to hear a case—a right which, in 
contrast to subject matter jurisdiction, can be waived or for-
feited. Given the historical evidence, how did we get to this 
point? The shift in thinking about the relationship between 
grand jury indictment and jurisdiction derives not from a con-
stitutional amendment or a novel interpretation by the Su-
preme Court of the text of the Grand Jury Clause, but from the 
legal realist criminal law reform project’s rejection of formalist 
and mechanical approaches to criminal procedure in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The reformers’ ef-
forts with respect to the grand jury culminated in the waiver of 
indictment provision of Rule 7. Rule 7 provides for waiver of 
grand jury indictment in non-capital cases.110 Courts seeking to 
 
lin, 523 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 110. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b). The Rule provides, in relevant part: “(b) Waiving 
Indictment. An offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year 
may be prosecuted by information if the defendant—in open court and after 
being advised of the nature of the charge and of the defendant’s rights—
waives prosecution by indictment.” Id. 
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decouple the right to grand jury indictment from the estab-
lishment of a district court’s jurisdiction over a criminal case 
have relied upon the fact that Rule 7 permits waiver. As the 
syllogism goes, subject matter jurisdiction never can be waived; 
Rule 7 permits waiver of grand jury indictment; therefore, 
grand jury indictment cannot be a prerequisite to a court’s ju-
risdiction. The reasoning is perfect provided that each step in 
the analysis is constitutionally sound. However, if Rule 7 is not 
constitutional, then waiver is not permissible, and the syllo-
gism fails. 
Rule 7’s constitutional foundations are questionable at 
best. The historical record shows that after many failed legisla-
tive attempts, the rulemaking process of the early 1940s cre-
ated a prime opportunity to address practical considerations 
raised by reformers bent upon enhancing the efficiency of dis-
position of criminal cases in federal courts. The symbiotic as-
cension of the FRCP and the momentum of the legal realist 
criminal reform project ensured an approach more concerned 
with the law in action than the law in books.111 The fresh view 
led to the gradual discarding of technical, mechanical, and 
categorical approaches to the law. Perhaps the promulgation of 
 
 111. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: 
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 93 (1973) (“[T]he real-
ists were driven by the twin motives of intellectual discovery and social im-
provement. They hoped to understand the legal process in a new and more 
useful manner, and they hoped to see both political and legal reform flow from 
their discoveries.”). Although the nuances shaping the contours of the philoso-
phy of legal realism are beyond the scope of this Article, it is sufficient for the 
limited purposes here to point out that: (1) some of those at the vanguard of 
criminal law reform in the early twentieth century are also included on the 
lists of legal thinkers who defined or influenced American Legal Realism; and 
(2) not only were the aims of the broad criminal law reform project compatible 
with those of American Legal Realism, they advanced them. Thus, for exam-
ple, Roscoe Pound is more accurately described as having belonged to the 
American sociological jurisprudence school. See G. Edward White, From Socio-
logical Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early 
Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1004 (1972). However, in the 
criminal law reform context, American Legal Realism shares enough of the 
characteristics of, and is sufficiently derived from, Pound’s philosophy that 
this Article, for sake of simplicity, refers to Pound and the core group of like-
minded, progressive criminal law reformers in the early twentieth century as 
“legal realists.” See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169–170 (1992); WILFRID 
E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1968); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Wielding the Double-Edged 
Sword: Charles Hamilton Houston and Judicial Activism in the Age of Legal 
Realism, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 17, 31 (1998). 
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no single provision of the FRCP was impacted more by this re-
form philosophy than that allowing waiver of indictment in 
non-capital felony cases. However, the realists, through the 
rulemaking process, disregarded the established understanding 
of the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury and adopted a 
pragmatic approach to waiver of indictment that eliminated 
grand jury indictment as a jurisdictional prerequisite—all 
without having to amend the Constitution. 
A. ENVIRONMENT OF REFORM 
1. American Legal Realism and Criminal Procedure Reform 
Early in the twentieth century, American Legal Realism 
shook the consciousness of U.S. legal culture with its call for re-
jection of nineteenth century formalism and its recognition of 
the importance of social realities in the law’s interpretation and 
administration. A prominent manifestation of this new ap-
proach to the law was found in the philosophy undergirding re-
form efforts in criminal law. This result is not surprising, given 
that a number of prominent legal realists were engaged in the 
criminal law reform movement of the early twentieth century. 
Roscoe Pound, then-dean of Harvard Law School, directed 
a well-received survey of the administration of criminal justice 
in Cleveland, Ohio, published in 1922.112 The survey, as co-
director Felix Frankfurter wrote in the preface, was conducted 
by “men whose professional interest is the scientific admini-
stration of justice adapted to modern industrial conditions”113 
and had the dual goals of “render[ing] an accounting of the 
functioning of this system”114 and “trac[ing] to their controlling 
sources whatever defects in the system the inquiry dis-
closed.”115 The study was hailed in the Harvard Law Review as 
having “demonstrated how it is sought to avoid the mechanical 
operation of legal rules in our administration of criminal jus-
tice.”116 
 
 112. See THE CLEVELAND FOUND., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (Ros-
coe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERI-
CAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 82 (1995) (describing the 
Cleveland study as, “the best of many such surveys”). 
 113. THE CLEVELAND FOUND., supra note 112, at vii. 
 114. Id. at v. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Note, Judicial Discretion in the Filing of Informations, 36 HARV. L. 
REV. 204, 204 (1922). 
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In the Cleveland study, Pound advocated reforms that had 
broader applicability to other jurisdictions,117 and he elsewhere 
was a vocal supporter of criminal law reform that rejected “an 
analytical scheme or rigid system worked out logically in librar-
ies on the sole basis of books and law reports.”118 Pound also 
subsequently served on President Hoover’s Wickersham Com-
mission, which studied a series of topics related to the admini-
stration of criminal justice in the United States. Pound’s major 
contribution to the commission’s work—a report on the prose-
cution function—recommended a number of bold reforms to the 
way criminal cases were adjudicated in the nation’s courts.119 
Another legal realist, Charles E. Clark, professor and dean 
of Yale Law School in the 1920s and 1930s and a strong propo-
nent of the use of empirical social science in law,120 engaged in 
a study of court administration in Connecticut, modeled after 
the Cleveland study.121 Clark, who had long been a student of 
reform of criminal and civil procedure and evidence,122 also sub-
sequently served as a consultant to the Wickersham Commis-
sion, studying federal district courts,123 and later served as re-
porter for the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.124 
One of the central tenets of the early twentieth century 
criminal reform movement was that adjudicatory criminal pro-
cedure was in need of overhaul.125 These reformers, a broad and 
 
 117. THE CLEVELAND FOUND., supra note 112, at 649–52. 
 118. Roscoe Pound, The Future of the Criminal Law, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
16 (1921) [hereinafter Pound, The Future]. 
 119. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON 
PROSECUTION 37–38 (1931). 
 120. See HORWITZ, supra note 111, at 312 n.85. 
 121. See CHARLES E. CLARK & HARRY SHULMAN, A STUDY OF LAW ADMINI-
STRATION IN CONNECTICUT (1937). 
 122. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 112, at 83. 
 123. See 1 AM. LAW INST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS (1934). 
 124. Interestingly, Clark’s work in Connecticut and on the federal courts 
with the Wickersham Commission was not as well-received as the Pound 
study. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 111, at 312 n.85; SCHLEGEL, supra note 
112, at 85–98. 
 125. See, e.g., SCHLEGEL, supra note 112, at 83 (discussing the view that 
“procedure was too technical and complicated and, as a result, allowed lawyers 
imbued with ‘the sporting theory of justice’ to avoid decisions on the merits of 
claims by playing procedural games”); Rollin M. Perkins, Absurdities in 
Criminal Procedure, 11 IOWA L. REV. 297, 318–19 (1926) (discussing reform 
efforts of the early twentieth century). 
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diverse collection of academic and legal reform groups,126 
thought that procedural rules laden with the rigidity and for-
malism of the previous two centuries were doing a disservice to 
the administration of criminal justice in the United States.127 
In 1906, Pound addressed the American Bar Association, cri-
tiquing the role of procedure in perverting adjudication into 
something more akin to a contest.128 
As Pound later wrote in 1921: 
The legal science of to-day, with its functional attitude, its study of 
law in action as well as law in books, its insistence upon justice 
through rules in contrast to abstractly just rules, and its insistence 
upon the limitations on effective legal action and the importance of 
discovering means of making legal rules achieve their purpose, could 
be made to do great things in the domain of criminal law.129 
Others would answer Pound’s call for a new approach to 
adjudicatory criminal procedure less concerned with the me-
chanical approaches of the nineteenth century and more adap-
tive to social conditions as they existed in the early twentieth 
century.130 
 
 126. See, e.g., SCHLEGEL, supra note 112, at 83–84 (noting antecedents of 
the movement for procedural reform in the 1920s and 1930s). 
 127. For instance, one commentator in 1911 lamented the “evils” criminal 
procedure visits upon the criminal justice system, and called for “sorely” 
needed reform. John Davison Lawson, Technicalities in Procedure, Civil and 
Criminal, 1 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 75, 85 (1911). An ob-
server in 1925 argued that judges in criminal cases were “applying antiquated 
rules of procedure, which have no life or vitality to cope with present social re-
quirements.” Lenn J. Oare, Our Antiquated Criminal Procedure, 1 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 35, 35 (1925). 
 128. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice, 29 AM. L. REV. 729, 731 (1906) (“The most impor-
tant and most constant cause of dissatisfaction with all law at all times is to 
be found in the necessarily mechanical operation of legal rules.”). 
 129. Pound, The Future, supra note 118, at 15. 
 130. See, e.g., Herbert S. Hadley, Present Conditions Historically Consid-
ered, 11 A.B.A. J. 674, 679 (1925) (calling for “changes in our system of proce-
dure as will tend to make our administration of justice prompt, efficient and 
final, and free it from its present burden of technicality and formalism that a 
dead past has imposed upon it”); Perkins, supra note 125, at 334 (“[N]ow it is 
high time the old cumbersome out-of-date methods of administering criminal 
justice were giving way to new, more in keeping with the needs of the twenti-
eth century.”). See generally Wayne L. Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury Sys-
tem, 10 OR. L. REV. 101 (1931) (discussing the results of a social science study 
of the American grand jury system). 
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2. Grand Jury Reform and Abolition 
At the same time as the early twentieth century rise to 
prominence of the legal realist approaches to reform of adjudi-
catory criminal procedure, the grand jury was coming under in-
creasing attack in the United States. The reformers in the 
United States, however, were not original in their attacks on 
the grand jury; they were merely following the lead of the Eng-
lish.131 From Jeremy Bentham’s early nineteenth century cri-
tiques of the grand jury,132 respect for the grand jury in Eng-
land continued to diminish throughout the nineteenth century 
and into the twentieth century,133 as detractors cited the per-
ceived corruption, inefficiency, and expense of the grand jury 
system. During World War I, the use of grand juries in England 
was suspended.134 Although English grand juries were rein-
stated in 1921, a groundswell of support for their permanent 
abolition had formed in the war years, and, during the 1920s, 
the anti-grand jury movement in England gained significant 
momentum. Ultimately, in the wake of criticism of the grand 
jury levied by prominent jurists and the perceived financial 
drain of the grand jury in Depression-era England, the House 
of Commons formed a commission to study the proposed aban-
donment of the grand jury system.135 The commission recom-
mended elimination of the grand jury, and, in September of 
1933, Parliament abolished the grand jury.136 
Anti-grand jury advocates in the United States certainly 
had been taking note. Although almost all of the original states 
provided for grand jury indictment in their constitutions, a 
 
 131. See generally Edson R. Sunderland, The English Struggle for Proce-
dural Reform, 39 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1926) (reviewing the history of English 
procedural reform). 
 132. See JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827); see 
also SHAPIRO, supra note 42, at 98–101; Richard D. Younger, The Grand Jury 
Under Attack, 46 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 26, 28 (1955) [here-
inafter Younger, The Grand Jury] (citing 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 
139–40, 171 (John Bowring ed., 1843); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF 
THE ART OF PACKING, AS APPLIED TO SPECIAL JURIES 14–28 (1821)). 
 133. See Younger, The Grand Jury, supra note 132, at 28–29, 32–35; Royal 
Commission on Delay in the King’s Bench Division, Second and Final Report 
of the Commissioners, Nov. 28, 1913 (recommending the abolition of the grand 
jury in England). 
 134. See Younger, The Grand Jury, supra note 132, at 217. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See Albert Lieck, Abolition of the Grand Jury in England, 25 J. AM. 
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 623, 623 (1934); Younger, The Grand Jury, su-
pra note 132, at 217. 
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movement away from indictment as a means of instituting 
state felony prosecutions continued throughout the nineteenth 
century.137 In 1884, the Supreme Court, in Hurtado, affirmed 
California’s use of the preliminary examination in lieu of grand 
jury indictment,138 a decision which led to further anti-grand 
jury sentiment at the state level in the late nineteenth cen-
tury.139 The sharp criticism of the grand jury continued into the 
twentieth century, and just as England was disposing of the 
ancient institution during the interwar period, the movement 
to abolish the grand jury gained traction in the United 
States.140 
This anti-grand jury sentiment was prevalent among those 
engaged in broader criminal law reform as part of the legal re-
alist project. The law reviews and bar journals of the 1920s and 
1930s are replete with calls for the reform or abolition of the 
grand jury.141 The Cleveland study deemed the grand jury re-
dundant in a system that also had provision for preliminary 
examination, and claimed that “[i]t is no longer needed as a 
bulwark of our liberties”142 and “does little more than rubber-
stamp the opinion of the prosecutor.”143 
 
 137. See, e.g., Younger, The Grand Jury, supra note 132, at 29–49. 
 138. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884). 
 139. See, e.g., Eugene Stevenson, Our Grand Jury System, 8 CRIM. L. MAG. 
& REP. 711, 715, 717 (1886) (calling for an anti-grand jury constitutional 
amendment in New Jersey and arguing that “the grand jury system would 
never be seriously suggested in our day if it did not already exist . . . .”); 
Younger, The Grand Jury, supra note 132, at 42–45. 
 140. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 38, at 35–44 (acknowledging contem-
porary criticism of grand juries); R. Justin Miller, Informations or Indictment 
in Felony Cases, 8 MINN. L. REV. 379, 407–08 (1923) (supporting Minnesota’s 
proposed move to information as a method of instituting all prosecutions). See 
generally George H. Dession & Isadore H. Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions 
of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L.J. 687 (1931) (offering criticisms of grand juries 
and reviewing the claims of critics). 
 141. See, e.g., Charles Kellogg Burdick, Possibility of Improvement by 
Statutory Changes and Constitutional Amendments Affecting Procedure, 11 
A.B.A. J. 510, 511–15 (1925) (questioning the utility of grand juries); Raymond 
Moley, The Initiation of Criminal Prosecutions by Indictment or Information, 
29 MICH. L. REV. 403, 425, 430–31 (1931) (presenting the results of a study 
comparing the two methods of initiating prosecutions). But see Jerome Hall, 
Analysis of Criticism of the Grand Jury, 22 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
692 (1931) (calling attention to possible problems with the critiques of grand 
juries). 
 142. THE CLEVELAND FOUND., supra note 112, at 211. 
 143. Id. at 212. Pound specifically called for the abolition of the grand jury 
in Cleveland. Id. at 650. 
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These designs for reforming or abolishing the grand jury 
were not limited to state grand juries.144 Although Pound’s ar-
guments were largely centered on the Cleveland grand jury, the 
Cleveland study bemoaned the “accumulation of detail and 
drain upon facilities, human and otherwise” effected by having 
both a grand jury and a preliminary examination at the federal 
level.145 Furthermore, the study echoed arguments made by 
Pound and others elsewhere regarding the grand jury institu-
tion in general, including federal grand juries.146 
The Hurtado opinion had freed states to abolish the grand 
jury, but whatever the reformers’ thoughts about the useful-
ness of the grand jury on the federal level, the Grand Jury 
Clause stood as an absolute bar to the abolition of the federal 
grand jury. Despite this constitutional obstacle to complete abo-
lition of the grand jury, however, a provision allowing felony 
defendants to waive the right to grand jury indictment, was, 
many reformers thought, an achievable goal. 
B. CAMPAIGN FOR WAIVABILITY OF FEDERAL GRAND JURY 
INDICTMENT 
As part of the larger movement to reform judicial proce-
dure in the criminal area, bar and law reform associations, 
judges, legal scholars, and politicians—including members of 
Congress and the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations—
engaged in a campaign to establish the availability of waiver in 
the grand jury context. Although discussion of indictment 
 
 144. There had long been grumblings about the efficacy and usefulness of 
the federal grand jury. Congress, in 1846, placed the summoning of federal 
grand juries within the discretion of the presiding judge. See Younger, The 
Grand Jury, supra note 132, at 31. In 1892, a Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court proposed the elimination of the grand jury to simplify criminal proce-
dure. See id. at 44, 47 (citing Justice (Henry B.) Brown, Assoc. Justice Su-
preme Court of the U.S., Address at Ohio Bar Association Annual Session 
(July 14, 1892), in 13 OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION REPORTS 35, 42–43 
(1892)). 
 145. THE CLEVELAND FOUND., supra note 112, at 190. 
 146. See RAYMOND MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 127–28 
(1929). The 1931 Wickersham Commission report concluded that “under mod-
ern conditions the grand jury is seldom better than a rubber stamp of the 
prosecuting attorney and has ceased to perform or be needed for the function 
for which it was established and for which it was retained throughout the cen-
turies.” NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 
119, at 124–25. One federal appellate court in 1928 lamented that the grand 
jury had atrophied beyond recognition. Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 
425 (2d Cir. 1928) (noting the “degradation of that ancient institution”). 
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waiver can be found in the context of state constitutional law 
early in the twentieth century,147 the debate with regard to 
waiver of federal grand jury indictment began in earnest in the 
early 1930s. The American Law Institute, in its 1930 Draft 
Code of Criminal Procedure, included a provision allowing 
prosecution for felony offenses without indictment.148 
The advocacy surrounding criminal procedure and grand 
jury reform would begin to migrate from the law reform and le-
gal academia circles and enter the political sphere in the early 
1930s. 
1. United States v. Gill 
Efforts to provide for waiver of indictment in federal crimi-
nal cases were aided immensely by a 1931 federal district court 
opinion, United States v. Gill.149 In Gill, the court was pre-
sented squarely with the question whether a defendant may 
waive indictment and “consent to be charged by information for 
an offense above the grade of misdemeanor.”150 The court in 
Gill reviewed the grand jury indictment’s historical position in 
the context of the common law and catalogued other waivable 
criminal procedural rights, including those related to self-
incrimination, speedy trial, confrontation of witnesses, double 
jeopardy, unreasonable searches and seizures, and assistance 
of counsel.151 
While acknowledging Ex parte Bain’s teaching that an in-
dictment is a prerequisite to a federal court’s jurisdiction over a 
criminal matter, the court pointed out that the right to trial by 
jury, which—up until the Supreme Court’s Patton v. United 
 
 147. See Note, The Constitutionality of a Statute Dispensing with Indict-
ment on Plea of Guilty, 29 HARV. L. REV. 326 (1916). 
 148. See AM. LAW INST., CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 113, 115 (1930) 
(permitting the government to choose to initiate prosecution by either infor-
mation or indictment; requiring indictment only in felony or capital cases 
where the defendant neither had nor waived preliminary examination). 
 149. United States v. Gill, 55 F.2d 399 (D.N.M. 1931). Judge Orie Phillips 
was elevated to the Tenth Circuit by President Hoover in 1929. Phillips, who 
later was considered for an appointment to the Supreme Court, was involved 
in the deliberations over the adoption of the waiver provision in the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. In 1950, he was awarded the prestigious Ameri-
can Bar Association Medal for his work in legal reform. See 75 REP. AM. BAR 
ASS’N 151, 152 (1950) (accepting award as recognition of “the work of judges 
and lawyers unselfishly striving together to make the law so living and dy-
namic as to meet the needs of a modern and complex society”). 
 150. Gill, 55 F.2d at 399. 
 151. Id. at 400. 
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States152 decision one year prior—also had been considered ju-
risdictional and non-waivable. However, as the court in Gill 
pointed out, the Patton Court explained that the common law’s 
aversion to waiver of the right to jury trial and other criminal 
procedural protections “‘was unquestionably founded upon the 
anxiety of the courts to see that no innocent man should be 
convicted’” in an age when penalties were disproportionately 
severe, counsel was not afforded to defendants, and waiver 
principles were applied harshly and without regard to the so-
phistication of unrepresented defendants.153 
Adopting the reasoning of Patton, which held that the right 
to trial by jury is waivable,154 the court in Gill declared that 
“the provision of the Fifth Amendment requiring an indictment 
in capital or other infamous cases creates a personal privilege 
which the defendant may waive.”155 
Thus, the Gill decision analogized the right to grand jury 
indictment to the right to jury trial, which had been declared by 
the court in 1930 to be waivable. This analogy, however, is 
flawed. Whether a defendant might forgo a jury trial and agree 
to a bench trial or even forgo trial altogether and plead guilty 
has no bearing on whether jurisdiction had been established 
over the criminal case in the first instance. If compliance with 
the Grand Jury Clause is a jurisdictional prerequisite, it is es-
sential no matter how the defendant is permitted to proceed to 
guilt adjudication under the Article III and Sixth Amendment 
clauses of the Constitution relating to the petit jury. This juris-
 
 152. 281 U.S. 276 (1930), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 
(1970); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s 
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 69–70 (2003) 
(noting the changes brought about by the Patton decision). 
 153. Gill, 55 F.2d at 402 (quoting Patton, 281 U.S. at 307 (citations omit-
ted)). 
 154. Id. at 403 (concluding that “the reasoning of the court in the Patton 
Case should apply with equal force” to the question of waivability of grand 
jury indictment). 
 155. Id. But see Ex parte McClusky, 40 F. 71, 74 (C.C.D. Ark. 1889) (“A 
party cannot waive a constitutional right when its effect is to give a court ju-
risdiction.” (citation omitted)); id. (“The fifth amendment to the constitution, 
that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous 
crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, provides for a 
requisite to jurisdiction.” (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887), overruled by 
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002); Parkinson v. United States, 121 
U.S. 281 (1887))). 
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dictional requirement is precisely how the federal courts 
viewed grand jury indictment for nearly a century and a half.156 
Even though the Gill court was willing to break with 
precedent and analogize the indictment provision to the jury 
trial right, the court concluded that, without congressional ac-
tion, an indictment was still a necessary prerequisite to invok-
ing federal criminal jurisdiction.157 Congress had not provided 
for any other method of initiating a felony prosecution. The 
fundamental holding of the Gill decision was that a grand jury 
indictment was a jurisdictional prerequisite in a felony case be-
cause Congress had not yet passed a law to the contrary, not 
because the Grand Jury Clause made it so. 
Despite Gill’s shortcomings, the case would spur on the re-
form project’s push for waiver of grand jury indictment. Using 
the Gill decision’s reasoning as a springboard, both bench and 
bar advanced the position that waiver of indictment should be 
permitted in federal criminal cases out of the expressed concern 
for detained defendants—particularly those held in districts 
 
 156. Furthermore, as Professor Akhil Amar has argued, the reasoning of 
the Patton Court is suspect in light of, for example, the plain language of those 
clauses. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 104–08. Also, aside from 
any quarrels one might have with the propriety of the analogy to the waivabil-
ity of the right to jury trial, at least the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the 
prior approach of treating jury trial as necessary to a court’s jurisdiction. At 
the time of Gill, the Supreme Court had not—and, indeed, still has not—
advanced any rationale for straying from the 150 years of treating the right to 
grand jury indictment as a mandatory, non-waivable jurisdictional prerequi-
site. 
 157. Gill, 55 F.2d at 404 (“[W]hile the provision of the Fifth Amendment 
requiring an indictment where the offense is capital or otherwise infamous 
creates a personal privilege which may be waived, it will take enabling legisla-
tion by Congress to authorize an accusation to be made in such a case by in-
formation filed by the United States Attorney.”). The court reasoned that be-
cause at common law only misdemeanors could be prosecuted by information, 
federal prosecutors could not proceed by information in felony cases, even if a 
defendant has waived indictment, in the absence of statutory abrogation of the 
common law rule. See id. (“It follows that no lawful accusation has been filed 
against the defendant; that the jurisdiction of the court was not properly in-
voked, and that the sentence was void.”). The court pointed out that although 
the language of the amendment did nothing to alter common law understand-
ings, it did “fix[ ] the matter, beyond the power of congress or the courts to al-
ter the course proceeding in bringing forward a charge of crime, in the class of 
cases embraced by the provision.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Albrecht v. 
United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5–6 & n.1 (1927); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1780 (1833) (“[The] process [of charging by informa-
tion] is rarely recurred to in America; and it has never yet been formally put 
into operation by any positive authority of congress, under the national gov-
ernment, in mere cases of misdemeanor . . . .”). 
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where grand juries met infrequently—who may wish to plead 
guilty in an attempt to expedite the commencement (and com-
pletion) of an expected term of imprisonment.158 Regardless of 
whether the expressions of concern for the welfare of criminal 
defendants were genuine,159 this “real world” view of how the 
rules of criminal procedure should serve the ends of efficiency 
and justice would be woven throughout the calls for provision of 
waiver. 
2. The Hoover Administration and Congress 
In 1932, Professor John B. Waite predicted that the Su-
preme Court would uphold as constitutional a provision for 
waiver of indictment should Congress pass such a statute.160 
Professor Waite’s prediction, which rested primarily upon com-
parison of the right to grand jury indictment with the jury trial 
right which had recently been held by the Supreme Court to be 
waivable,161 was prompted by a recommendation made to Con-
gress by President Herbert Hoover earlier that year. 
 
 158. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 7; 6 FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE: WITH NOTES AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 156–57 (Alexander Holtzoff 
ed., 1946); Homer Cummings, The Third Great Adventure, 3 F.R.D. 283, 285 
(1944) (“A highly desirable provision of the Rules permits a defendant, except 
in a capital case, to waive indictment and to consent to prosecution by infor-
mation.”); Alexander Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal Procedure, 3 F.R.D. 
445, 449–50 (1944) [hereinafter Holtzoff, Reform] (discussing how the provi-
sion aids indigent defendants unable to make bail); Alexander Holtzoff, Some 
Problems of Federal Criminal Procedure, 2 F.R.D. 431, 436 (1943) [hereinafter 
Holtzoff, Some Problems] (describing how defendants in rural and outlying 
districts “may languish in jail for a number of months before he can be in-
dicted”). 
 159. There is a degree of irony in the call for the diminution of the grand 
jury to protect criminal defendants. As this Part shows, much of the political 
support for the waiver provision derived from a desire to reduce the costs of 
administering the criminal justice system, a goal against which the Bill of 
Rights might sometimes be found in opposition. Of course, there were ways 
other than allowing waiver of grand jury indictment to protect the reformers’ 
hypothetical defendant from languishing in confinement awaiting the empan-
elling of a grand jury. For example, pre-trial release could be expanded, addi-
tional grand juries could be empanelled, defendants could consent to be trans-
ferred to other districts or divisions where grand juries may be sitting, or 
grand juries simply could sit more frequently in all districts. Indeed, many 
such accommodations are necessitated by the statutory framework developed 
pursuant to the Speedy Trial Clause. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–74 (2000). 
 160. See John B. Waite, President Hoover’s Recommendations—Waiver of 
Right to Accusation by Grand Jury Indictment, 30 MICH. L. REV. 922, 928 
(1932) (quoting President Asks for Reforms in Judicial System, U.S. DAILY 
(Wash., D.C.), Mar. 1, 1932, at 1. 
 161. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930), abrogated by 
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President Hoover urged Congress to legislate a provision 
for waiver of indictment for purposes that would be cited by 
proponents of waiver throughout their campaign: 
Legislation should be enacted to permit an accused person to waive 
the requirement of indictment by grand jury. Where the accused ad-
mits his guilt, preliminary hearings and grand-jury proceedings are 
not necessary for his protection, they cause unnecessary expense and 
delay. In such cases the law should permit immediate plea and sen-
tence upon the filing of an information. That would allow the accused 
to begin immediate service of his sentence without languishing in jail 
to await action of a grand jury, and would reduce the expense of 
maintenance of prisoners, lessen the work of prosecutors, and tend to 
speed up disposition of criminal cases.162 
At the time of President Hoover’s remarks, the Seventy-
Second Congress already was acting upon legislation providing 
for waiver of indictment in federal criminal cases.163 Senate Bill 
2655, an Act “providing for waiver of prosecution by indictment 
in certain criminal proceedings,” allowed for waiver of indict-
ment, in open court and in writing, unless a preliminary ex-
amination had previously resulted in the discharge of the de-
fendant.164 
Although the bill was easily passed in the Senate, it was 
the subject of controversy in the House,165 where the Judiciary 
Committee produced a minority report signed by eleven mem-
bers.166 In contrast to the views of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee and the House Judiciary Committee majority that the 
 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
 162. See HERBERT HOOVER, SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS ON RE-
FORM OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, (1932), reprinted in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HERBERT HOOVER 83, 86 (1977); Waite, 
supra note 160, at 928 (quoting President Asks for Reforms in Judicial System, 
supra note 160). 
 163. See 72 CONG. REC. 75, 5092 (1932). 
 164. See id. 
 165. During debate, Representative Thomas D. McKeown, Democrat of 
Oklahoma, stressed that the waiver provision did not deprive a defendant of 
the right to grand jury involuntarily, but it made guilty pleas more efficient 
and would save the treasury between $250,000 to $300,000 per annum. 72 
CONG. REC. 76, 698–99 (1932). Representative Burnett M. Chiperfield, Repub-
lican of Illinois, expressed a concern with coercion of vulnerable defendants 
and argued that the provision “is an iniquitous measure and it should not be 
passed in this way.” Id. Representative Fiorello H. La Guardia, Republican of 
New York, lauded the grand jury as “one of the outstanding protections to in-
dividuals of our whole Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, and it should not be 
brushed aside on a plea of saving $250,000, to be spread over a whole nation.” 
Id. at 698–99. 
 166. See H.R. REP. NO. 72-1300, at 8 (1932). 
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right to indictment “is personal and may be waived,”167 the mi-
nority report of the House Judiciary Committee asserted the 
view that grand jury indictment is a mandatory prerequisite to 
a district court’s jurisdiction.168 Dismissing the analogy to the 
Patton Court’s approval of waiver of the right jury trial, the 
minority report argued that the grand jury right “is not merely 
a right of the defendant, personal to him, which may be 
waived,” but is “a restriction upon the right and jurisdiction of 
the court, and it is beyond the power of any defendant to confer 
jurisdiction where none would otherwise exist.”169 
Notably, the minority report saw in the waiver provision 
an attempt by the criminal law reformers to achieve their ulti-
mate goal of abolition of the grand jury: 
That this bill is an attempt to weaken the protection accorded the 
citizen by the grand jury system can not be denied; and if we begin to 
countenance attacks upon that system, it may not be long until other 
legislators, sitting in our places, will begin to listen to the arguments 
of other legal writers who have been for years insisting that the grand 
jury has outgrown its usefulness, and should be abolished in its en-
tirety.170 
Although the Senate Committee that had reported favora-
bly on Senate Bill 2655 also acknowledged the historical rela-
tionship between grand jury indictment and jurisdiction,171 the 
House minority report demonstrated that, even into the 1930s, 
there was still a recognition of the jurisdictional heritage of the 
grand jury.172 
Despite the failure of legislative attempts to provide for 
waiver of indictment,173 a steady drumbeat of pro-waiver advo-
cacy emanated from the Department of Justice during the 
 
 167. S. REP. NO. 72-201, at 2–3 (1932); see also H.R. REP. NO. 72-1300, at 
2–3. 
 168.  H.R. REP. NO. 72-1300, at 5–8. 
 169. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 170. Id. at 7. 
 171. S. REP. NO. 72-201, at 2 (“For many years it was generally held that 
an indictment by a grand jury was jurisdictional; that it was indispensable to 
the power of a court to try a person accused of a felony, and, accordingly could 
not be waived.”). 
 172. H.R. REP. NO. 72-1300, at 5–8. The minority report also asserted that 
the waiver of indictment would expose less sophisticated defendants to undue 
pressure from the government, and made a textual argument that the lan-
guage of the Grand Jury Clause is of a mandatory nature. See id. at 6–8. 
 173. Both S. 2655, 72nd Cong. (1932), and S. 1518, 73rd Cong. (1933), iden-
tical bills introduced during the first session of the seventy-second and sev-
enty-third Congresses respectively, failed to become law. Similar legislation 
introduced during the Roosevelt administrations also met a similar fate. 
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1930s. A review of the annual reports of attorneys general in 
that decade evidences repeated calls for legislative action on 
the issue of waivability.174 By the late 1930s, Roosevelt Attor-
ney General Homer Cummings, who had earlier highlighted 
the issue of “waiver of indictment by grand jury in certain 
criminal cases,”175 spurred the Justice Department to draft and 
propose legislation on waivability by the Justice Department: 
At my request a number of bills drafted in the Department of Justice 
were introduced and are now pending before the Congress. Their pur-
pose is to eliminate archaic technicalities and to make possible 
greater expedition in the disposition of criminal cases without depriv-
ing defendants of any substantial rights to which they should be enti-
tled. Among such measures are the following: To permit the defen-
dant to waive indictment by grand jury and to consent to prosecution 
by information.176 
The criminal law reformers’ 1930s campaign for waivabil-
ity waged in the law reviews, law reform and bar groups, lower 
courts, the Congress, and the executive branch, though unsuc-
cessful, had gained enough momentum to capitalize on the 
golden opportunity presented by the federal criminal proce-
dural judicial rulemaking of the 1940s. 
C. THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 
Despite the more general procedural reform efforts of the 
early twentieth century, by the end of the 1930s federal crimi-
 
 174. For example, in his 1931 annual report, Herbert Hoover’s Attorney 
General William D. Mitchell wrote: 
Legislation should be enacted permitting an accused to waive the re-
quirement of an indictment by a grand jury. Where the accused in-
tends to plead guilty, preliminary hearings and grand jury proceed-
ings are needless for his protection and cause unnecessary expense 
and delay. In such cases the law should permit the filing of an infor-
mation and immediate plea and sentence. Such a system will tend to 
speed up the disposition of criminal cases. The recent decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States respecting waiver by the accused 
of the right to trial by petit jury, and the recent recommendation by 
the judicial conference respecting this matter, give ground to believe 
that there is no valid constitutional objection to this proposal. 
1931 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 2–3; see also 1932 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 6 (“I call 
special attention to the pending bill to allow waiver of indictments by the ac-
cused . . . .”). 
 175. 1933 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 1. 
 176. 1937 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 11. Likewise, Cummings’ successor, Frank 
Murphy, used his 1940 annual report “to call attention also to the following 
pending legislation drafted in this Department: A bill to permit a defendant in 
a criminal case to waive indictment by grand jury (H.R. 1994).” 1939 ATT’Y 
GEN. ANN. REP. 7. 
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nal procedure was still “in a somewhat amorphous and disor-
ganized state.”177 Prior to the promulgation of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the procedure guiding criminal 
matters in federal courts was a hodge-podge gleaned from the 
common law, federal statutes “sporadically enacted at different 
times in regard to isolated points,”178 and the law of the forum 
state “to which the Federal courts conform in respect to many 
matters which are not governed by Federal statutes.”179 Rules 
governing federal civil procedure had been promulgated during 
the 1930s with great success.180 Against this backdrop, the fre-
quent advocacy regarding the proposed grand jury waiver pro-
vision, and the need for other criminal procedure rules more 
generally, prompted Congress to act.181 
On June 29, 1940, Congress authorized the Supreme Court 
to promulgate rules governing federal criminal procedure, just 
as it had in previous years for civil procedure and for appellate 
procedure in criminal cases.182 The Court appointed an Advi-
 
 177. Alexander Holtzoff, Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure, 3 F.R.D. 
420, 420 (1944) [hereinafter Holtzoff, Proposed Rules]; see also Robert J. 
Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Consti-
tution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 749–50 (2001) (noting that, with few exceptions, 
federal courts applied state procedural law into the twentieth century). 
 178. Holtzoff, Proposed Rules, supra note 177, at 420; see also United 
States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953) (arguing that the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure were meant to promote simplicity in procedure). 
 179. Holtzoff, Proposed Rules, supra note 177, at 420; see also Holtzoff, Re-
form, supra note 158, at 447. 
 180. See Homer Cummings, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
5 F.R.D. 20, 22 (1946). 
 181. See Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, 5 F.R.D. 88, 91 (1946). The adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure had been urged by, among others, then-Attorney General Robert 
Jackson. In his Annual Report of the Attorney General for the fiscal year ended 
1940, Jackson noted that the Supreme Court’s promulgation of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, made possible by the congressional enabling act of 
June 19, 1934, made the new civil rules “probably the simplest form of civil 
procedure yet devised in any jurisdiction in which Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence 
prevails.” 1940 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP 5. Jackson went on to note, however, that 
criminal procedure remained “largely in a chaotic and archaic state” with 
“[m]any technicalities dating back a century or two. . . .” Id. Praising the re-
cent passage of an enabling act empowering the Supreme Court to promulgate 
rules of criminal procedure, Jackson was optimistic that the act would “un-
doubtedly lead to a reform in criminal procedure that will be as vital as the 
recent changes in civil procedure.” Id. 
 182. See Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688; Arthur T. Vanderbilt, 
New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure, 29 A.B.A. J. 376, 376 (1943). For a 
discussion of the development and restoration of judicial rulemaking authority 
in the 1930s and 1940s, see Alexander Holtzoff, Participation of the Bar in Ju-
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sory Committee to draft the new rules.183 The seventeen mem-
ber Committee, chaired by Arthur T. Vanderbilt, a former 
president of the American Bar Association, was comprised of 
prominent practitioners and academics, learned in the criminal 
law and drawn from across the United States.184 Some of the 
nation’s foremost advocates of criminal law reform served on 
the Committee, including George H. Dession of Yale Law 
School and Sheldon Glueck of Harvard Law School, both advo-
cates of integrating social considerations into criminal proc-
esses.185 
At the same time the Court and Advisory Committee were 
undertaking to develop the new criminal rules, the advocacy for 
waivability continued. In the early 1940s, the Judicial Confer-
ence of Senior Circuit Judges recommended that “existing law 
or established procedure be so changed that a defendant may 
waive indictment and plead guilty to an information filed by a 
United States attorney in all cases except capital felonies.”186 
The judges stated that the rationale for provision for waiver of 
indictment was so that “a defendant, who desires to plead 
guilty, [can] avoid the delays which sometimes occur when the 
impaneling of a grand jury to find an indictment is required.”187 
As many reformers had been arguing, waiver of indictment was 
necessary to facilitate pre-indictment guilty pleas. 
These pro-waiver sentiments manifested in the prelimi-
nary draft of the proposed rules, transmitted to Chief Justice 
Harlan F. Stone from the Committee in May of 1942.188 Rule 
 
dicial Rule-Making, 3 F.R.D. 165 (1944) [hereinafter Holtzoff, Participation]; 
Holtzoff, Reform, supra note 158, at 431. 
 183. See Appointment of Advisory Committee on Rules in Criminal Cases, 
312 U.S. 717 (1941); Holtzoff, Some Problems, supra note 158. 
 184. Holtzoff, Participation, supra note 182, at 166; Holtzoff, Reform, supra 
note 158, at 447 (listing members and affiliations). 
 185. See ADVISORY COMM. ON THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FED-
ERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT, at iii–iv 
(1944). In addition to the Advisory Committee itself, there were judicially-
appointed bar committees organized in each federal judicial district in the 
United States that would critique each draft of the rules along with national, 
state, county, and city bar associations and members of the federal bench. See 
Holtzoff, Participation, supra note 182, at 167. 
 186. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES, REPORT OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 9 (1941). 
 187. Id.  
 188. Letter from the Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure 
to the Honorable Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice of the U.S. (May 23, 1942) 
[hereinafter May 23 Letter to Chief Justice Stone], reprinted in 1 DRAFTING 
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8(b) provided as follows: “In a case not punishable by death a 
defendant represented by counsel may consent that the pro-
ceeding be by information instead of by indictment and in that 
event the United States attorney may file an information or 
proceed by indictment.”189 
But despite the provision for waiver of indictment in the 
preliminary draft of the rules, questions remained regarding 
the constitutionality of the rule. In 1941, William W. Barron of 
the Justice Department, which favored the provision for 
waiver, described the dissent as such: “Some very conscientious 
and literal-minded lawyers see an insurmountable objection to 
the proposal. They view the constitutional right to be proceeded 
against by indictment as a jurisdictional requirement which 
cannot be waived.”190 
Questions regarding the constitutionality of the waiver 
provision came even from the Supreme Court. Chief Justice 
Stone, in offering feedback to the Advisory Committee on the 
preliminary draft on behalf of the Court, commented specifi-
cally on Rule 8(b): “This rule, authorizing waiver of indictment, 
raises questions of policy and possibly constitutionality, which 
should be the subject of annotation.”191 
 
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3, 3–5 (Madeleine 
J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin eds., 1991) [hereinafter DRAFTING HISTORY]; May 
1942 Preliminary Draft of Advisory Committee, reprinted in 1 DRAFTING HIS-
TORY, supra, at 52, 52–53 [hereinafter May 1942 Preliminary Draft]. 
 189. May 1942 Preliminary Draft, supra note 188, at 52. Rule 8(a) reflected 
the waivability set out in Rule 8(b); (“Accusation of an offense which may be 
punished by death shall be by indictment. Accusation of an offense which may 
be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or by hard labor 
shall be by indictment or, if indictment is waived, by information. Accusation 
of any other offense may be by indictment or by information.”). 
 190. William W. Barron, Proposed Rules of Procedure in Criminal Cases. A 
Prosecutor’s Viewpoint, 2 F.R.D. 211, 214–15 (1943) (citing United States v. 
Gill, 55 F.2d 399 (D.N.M. 1931); Ex parte McClusky, 40 F. 71 (C.C.D. Ark. 
1889); Edwards v. State, 45 N.J.L. 419 (N.J. 1883); People ex rel. Battista v. 
Christian, 249 N.Y. 314 (1928)). Barron went on to counter that “[w]e think 
the Patton case and the reasoning employed in reaching that decision disposes 
of the constitutional objection for the federal courts as it has been disposed of 
by some of the state courts.” Id. at 215 (citing Patton v. United States, 281 
U.S. 276 (1930), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)). Barron 
also recounted and dismissed concern that a waiver provision would allow in-
fluential defendants to persuade prosecutors to proceed by information rather 
than indictment. See id. 
 191.  Memorandum from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice to Arthur T. Van-
derbilt, Chairman Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure (June 
16, 1942), reprinted in 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 11, 15 (em-
phasis added). The comment went on:  
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The Advisory Committee took this and other comments on 
the rules and, the following year, produced a new preliminary 
draft, accompanied by annotations. In this draft, transmitted 
from the committee to Chief Justice Stone on May 3, 1943,192 
the language of the Rule read as follows: “An offense not pun-
ishable by death may be prosecuted by information if the de-
fendant, being represented by counsel, waives indictment in 
writing.”193 
Although the changes to the previous draft were, for the 
most part, stylistic,194 the annotations shed a good deal of light 
on the thinking of the committee. The Note to Rule 8 acknowl-
 
One purpose of the rule, we understand, is to enable a defendant to go 
to trial promptly in a division of a district where grand juries sit in-
frequently. Would that not be possible under [proposed] Rule 22 [pro-
viding for the transfer of proceedings, with consent of the defendant, 
from one court to another within a judicial district] and, if so, are 
there other reasons for the proposal of Rule 8? 
Id. at 16; see also ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE (1942), reprinted in 1 DRAFT-
ING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 70, 70. 
 192. Letter from Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chairman Advisory Comm. on Fed. 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice (May 3, 1943), 
reprinted in 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at XIII, XIII–XVI. The Sec-
retary of the Committee, Alexander Hotlzoff, had, in September of 1942, pre-
pared a memorandum regarding the desirability of waiver if indictment. See 
Memorandum of Alexander Holtzoff on Waiver of Indictment (Sept. 1, 1942), 
reprinted in 2 FILES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PRAC-
TICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CM-1057 (1942). The memorandum emphasized 
only practical considerations and did not attempt to address the constitutional 
issues posed by the proposed provision for waiver. See id. 
 193. FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PRELIMINARY DRAFT [here-
inafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT], reprinted in 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 
188, at 27, 28. As with the May 1942 preliminary draft, Rule 8(a) of this draft 
reflected the waivability set out in Rule 8(b):  
Offenses shall be prosecuted in the district court by indictment or by 
information as provided by these rules. An offense which may be pun-
ished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An offense which 
may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at 
hard labor shall be prosecuted by indictment or, if indictment is 
waived, by information. Any other offense may be prosecuted by in-
dictment or by information.  
Id. at 27. Another interesting feature of Rule 8 in this draft can be found in 
Rule 8(c), which provided that “[t]he information shall be signed by the attor-
ney for the government and may be filed only by leave of court.” Id. at 28. 
 194. One major change was the deletion of the language “and in that event 
the United States attorney may file an information or proceed by indictment.” 
May 1942 Preliminary Draft, supra note 188, at 53 (emphasis added). This 
language appears to allow the government to proceed by indictment (and, pre-
sumably, avail itself of the compulsory process of the grand jury) even over the 
effective waiver of grand jury indictment by a defendant. 
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edged that “[t]he present law is not changed by the subdivision 
except in the provision . . . . for prosecution of an infamous 
crime by information if indictment is waived.”195 In response to 
the Supreme Court’s concerns about the constitutionality of the 
waiver provision, the committee cited United States v. Gill,196 
and argued that the rule, once passed, “would supply the legis-
lative authority considered to be necessary for proceeding by 
information in non-capital cases.”197 Thus, the Advisory Com-
mittee assumed that a lone 1930s district court opinion more 
accurately interpreted the Grand Jury Clause than the consis-
tent approach taken by the Supreme Court and other federal 
courts over the prior century and a half. 
In May of 1943, the Chief Justice, without critical com-
ment, authorized the Advisory Committee to circulate the pre-
liminary draft of the proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, along with annotations, to both bench and bar.198 The 
Rules were discussed at circuit judicial conferences, and com-
ments were received from federal judges, various bar commit-
tees (including the American Bar Association) as well as from 
government and private attorneys.199 In soliciting such com-
mentary and discussion on the preliminary draft through an 
article in the American Bar Association Journal in July of 
1943, Arthur Vanderbilt, the Chairman of the Advisory Com-
mittee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, commented 
specifically on the waiver provision of proposed Rule 8(b), not-
ing that 
[e]xpress provision is made to permit the defendant to waive indict-
ment and to consent to prosecution by information. (Rule 8-B.) This 
 
 195. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 193, at 30. 
 196. 55 F.2d 399 (D.N.M. 1931). 
 197. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 193, at 30–31. The note also argues 
the necessity of a provision for waiver of indictment, for purposes of expedi-
ency and to serve the interests of criminal defendants who would rather com-
mence proceedings than wait for an available grand jury. Id. at 31. Another 
interesting note to Rule 8 deals with the rationale for excluding the present-
ment as a third form of formal accusation. See id. at 32. See generally Renee 
Lettow, Note, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 YALE L.J. 1333, 
1337 (1994) (exploring the relationship of presentment and the grand jury in 
the early republic). 
 198. Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice, to Arthur T. Vanderbilt, 
Chairman, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure (May 22, 
1943), reprinted in 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at XVII, XVII–XVIII. 
 199. Letter from Alexander Holtzoff, Sec’y of the Advisory Comm. on Fed. 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (Sept. 25, 1943), reprinted in 2–3 DRAFTING HISTORY, su-
pra note 188, at 362. 
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provision is of particular importance in those districts, constituting a 
majority, where the grand jury convenes two or four times a year. In 
such jurisdictions a defendant who is unable to give bail may be con-
fined in jail for several months awaiting a grand jury to convene al-
though he expects to plead guilty and is anxious for an expeditious 
disposition of the case.200 
By September 1943, the first round of commentary was cir-
culated to the Committee. The comments, sent primarily from 
sitting federal judges and United States Attorneys, overwhelm-
ingly favored the adoption of the provision for waiver of indict-
ment, most for the same reasons put forward by the committee 
in the annotations to the proposed rule.201 The second install-
ment of commentary, received by the committee in October of 
1943, continued much of the same.202 
 
 200. Vanderbilt, supra note 182, at 377; see also James J. Robinson, The 
Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 27 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 
38, 45 (1943). That same summer, former Attorney General Homer Cummings 
spoke in support of the proposed rules, describing proposed Rule 8(b) as a 
“highly desirable provision” that would help indigent defendants to reduce 
time spent in pre-trial detention awaiting indictment, particularly in districts 
where grand juries met infrequently. Homer Cummings, The Third Great Ad-
venture, 29 A.B.A. J. 654, 655 (1943) (reprinting the address delivered before 
the annual meeting of the Institute on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on 
August 24, 1943). The talk was thus titled because Cummings considered the 
promulgation of the criminal rules the third and final step—following the ear-
lier promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the establish-
ment of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts—toward “a 
rounded system of judicial rule-making.” Id. at 654. 
 201. See COMMENTS TO PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES OF CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE, RULE 8(b) [hereinafter FIRST ROUND COMMENTS TO RULE 8(b)], re-
printed in 2–3 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 65, 65–68. Indeed, many 
commentators suggested that even unrepresented defendants should be per-
mitted to waive indictment. See id. 
 202. See COMMENTS TO PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES OF CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE, RULE 8(b) [hereinafter SECOND ROUND COMMENTS TO RULE 8(b)], re-
printed in 2–3 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 363, 363–66a; Letter 
from Alexander Holtzoff, Secretary of the Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, to the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (Oct. 4, 1943), reprinted in 2–3 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, 
at 362. There were a few dissenting voices, however, including those who 
thought compliance with the procedural requirements of the waiver rule was 
too cumbersome, as well as those who maintained that the rule contravened 
the Grand Jury Clause. Nevertheless, the overwhelming tenor of the com-
ments was positive. Interestingly, one of the commentators was Judge Orie L. 
Phillips of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, who had authored 
the opinion in Gill when he had been a district court judge in the District of 
New Mexico. Phillips was as willing to take the credit as he was deserving of 
it:  
This waiver of indictment is my baby. I started that back in 1923 and 
I undertook to start it by first writing a decision in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings which was that the defendants could constitutionally waive 
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In November of 1943, the Committee transmitted the sec-
ond preliminary draft of the proposed Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure to the Supreme Court.203 In this draft, the provision for 
waiver of indictment was re-titled Rule 7(b) and read as fol-
lows: “An offense not punishable by death may be prosecuted 
by information if the defendant, after he has been advised of 
the nature of the charge and of his rights, waives in open court 
prosecution by indictment.”204 
Again, the Note to the waiver rule relied solely on the Gill 
decision for its constitutionality and stressed the efficiency 
benefits of pre-indictment guilty pleas.205 The Note cited 
Pound’s Cleveland survey and other surveys, the Wickersham 
Commission reports, and the American Law Institute Code for 
the proposition that the waiver provision was a much-needed 
reform.206 
In May and June of 1944, the Committee received install-
ments of comments on the second preliminary draft of the pro-
posed Rules of Criminal Procedure.207 Although many of the 
 
indictment, and that is found in the annotations, here, the case re-
ported in New Mexico.  
SECOND ROUND COMMENTS TO RULE 8(b), supra, at 363. Phillips, who made 
his comments at an August 24, 1943 American Bar Association meeting on the 
proposed rules, reiterated his rationale for the constitutionality of the provi-
sion for waiver of indictment:  
I don’t think there is any doubt about the constitutionality upon the 
basis of the holdings of the courts that the other provisions for the 
protection of the defendants, such as the right of trial by common law 
jury, right to be confronted with your witnesses and so forth, may be 
waived.  
Id. 
 203. See Letter from Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure 
to the Chief Justice and Assoc. Justices of the Supreme Court of the United 
States (Nov. 19, 1943), reprinted in 4 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 
XIII–XIV. 
 204. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FEDERAL 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT 22 (1944). As 
with previous versions of the rule, this proposed Rule 7 required indictment in 
capital cases, required indictment in non-capital felony cases in which there 
was no waiver, and allowed prosecution by either indictment or information 
for all other offenses. Also, the annotations remained substantially the same 
as in the first preliminary draft. See id. 
 205. See id. at 24–25. 
 206. See id. at 25. 
 207. See ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FED-
ERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT (1944), 
reprinted in 4 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at III, III–IV; Letter from 
Alexander Holtzoff, Sec’y of the Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, to the Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure (May 
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comments echoed earlier ones applauding the provision of 
waiver for purposes of expediting the criminal process for de-
fendants detained pre-trial in rural areas,208 there were com-
ments again questioning the advisability of the provision. Such 
comments ran the spectrum from calling for waiver only when 
in written form, to opposing waivability by unrepresented de-
fendants, to doubting the constitutionality of the provision.209 
One comment, a “[s]ummary of views of Tennessee Federal 
Judges,” set out the views of Judge John D. Martin of the Sixth 
Circuit and Judge Elmer Davis Davies of the Middle District of 
Tennessee that “it is unwise to disturb a long established 
workable practice by a new procedure of doubtful constitution-
ality.”210 
 
29, 1944), reprinted in 5 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188; Letter from Alex-
ander Holtzoff, Sec’y of the Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, to the Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure (June 6, 
1944), reprinted in 5–6 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188. 
 208. See COMMENTS TO THE SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 8(B) (Sept. 14, 1943), [hereinafter COMMENTS TO 
THE SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT], reprinted in 5–6 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra 
note 188, at 27, 27–28a. 
 209. See id. One comment served to undermine the central rationale for the 
provision of waiver—expediting the criminal process for defendants who desire 
to plead guilty but are detained in districts with infrequent grand jury sit-
tings. Harry C. Blanton, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of 
Missouri, who supported the provision of waiver, observed that often in such 
outlying districts, judges sit as infrequently as grand juries and, therefore, de-
fendants—who had to waive indictment and plead guilty in open court—“will 
have to wait as long as [they] would for a Grand Jury.” See id. at 17. Another 
comment, from the Federal Grand Jury Association for the Southern District 
of New York, advocated removing the ability of prosecutors to choose whether 
a matter can be prosecuted by indictment or information. See id. at 16. Under 
the proposed Rule 7(a), non-capital felony cases could be prosecuted by infor-
mation if the defendant waived indictment and misdemeanor cases could be 
prosecuted by either information or indictment. The Association was,  
opposed to giving prosecutors, some of whom like to be untrammeled 
and are irked by having to defer to a Grand Jury, freedom to do ‘trad-
ing’ with accused persons to persuade them that a trial prosecuted by 
information would be more to their advantage than a trial prosecuted 
by indictment.  
Id. 
 210.  COMMENTS TO THE SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 208, at 
27. Perhaps part of the challenge for opponents of the waiver rule was that 
they seemed unable to articulate a strong rebuttal to the practical arguments 
being advanced by the pro-waiver reformers. Instead of merely resting upon 
the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury, a better strategy might have been 
to argue that, even in a modern criminal justice system, protection for individ-
ual defendants might better be served by enhancing the role of grand jury 
rather than diminishing it.  
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In June of 1944, the final report of the Advisory Committee 
on the Rules of Criminal Procedure was issued with the final 
draft of the rules, with the language for provision of waiver of 
indictment remaining unchanged from the previous draft.211 
The Rules were transmitted to Attorney General Francis 
Biddle by Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone in December of 1944212 
and Biddle submitted them to Congress in January of 1945.213 
Ultimately, the advocacy on the part of the judges and the 
bar bore fruit. With the adoption in 1946214 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure came a provision for waiver of in-
dictment in non-capital felony cases: 
Rule 7. The Indictment and the Information. 
 (a) USE OF INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION. An offense which 
may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An of-
fense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year or at hard labor shall be prosecuted by indictment, or if in-
dictment is waived, it may be prosecuted by information. Any other 
offense may be prosecuted by indictment or by information. An infor-
mation may be filed without leave of court. 
 (b) WAIVER OF INDICTMENT. An offense which may be punished 
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor may 
be prosecuted by information if the defendant, after he has been ad-
vised of the nature of the charge and of his rights, waives in open 
 
In addition to speaking of the ways short of waiver in which, as noted 
above, the grand jury process might be altered to avoid lengthy pre-indictment 
detention of defendants, waiver opponents might have pointed out the pres-
sures that could be brought to bear upon an unsophisticated defendant to have 
him or her waive indictment and plead guilty to a charge of the prosecutor’s 
choosing rather than have the grand jury pass upon the merits of any such 
charge. Such coercion would not be possible where the grand jury indictment 
is treated as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Furthermore, those opposed to the 
waiver rule might have tried to counter the broader philosophical argument 
being made by the reformers—that the grand jury was no longer a useful tool 
for protecting individual liberty. In response to this anti-grand jury argument, 
defenders of the grand jury might have gone on the offensive, arguing that not 
only should we decline to diminish the grand jury’s role in criminal procedure, 
but we should make it more robust. 
 211. See Letter from Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure 
to the Chief Justice and Assoc. Justices of the Supreme Court of the U.S. (July 
1944), reprinted in 7 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 13, 13. 
 212. See Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice, to Francis Biddle, At-
torney General (Dec. 26, 1944), reprinted in 7 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 
188, at 125, 125. 
 213. See Letter from Francis Biddle to the Senate and House of Represen-
tatives of the United States of America (Jan. 3, 1945), reprinted in 7 DRAFTING 
HISTORY, supra note 188, at 123, 123. 
 214. The Rules went into effect on March 21, 1946. 
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court prosecution by indictment.215 
With regard to the issue of constitutionality, the Note to 
Rule 7(b) cited United States v. Gill for the proposition that the 
“constitutional guaranty of indictment by grand jury may be 
waived by [the] defendant,”216 and pointed to “other constitu-
tional guaranties [that] may be waived by the defendant,”217 in-
cluding trial by jury, right to counsel, protection against double 
jeopardy, privilege against self-incrimination, and confronta-
tion of witnesses.218 
With its formal authorization to the government to proceed 
by information in the face of an effective waiver of indictment 
by a defendant in a felony case, Rule 7(b) of the new Federal 
Rules removed the final impediment to the waiver of grand jury 
indictment. After the rules went into effect in March of 1946, 
initial reports were that the waiver provision performed its in-
tended function, improving efficiency of the federal criminal 
process and allowing certain defendants to avoid pre-
indictment incarceration.219 
 
 215. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7 (1946). The Advisory Committee Notes accompany-
ing Rule 7(b) explained that: 
Opportunity to waive indictment and to consent to prosecution by in-
formation will be a substantial aid to defendants, especially those 
who, because of inability to give bail, are incarcerated pending action 
of the grand jury, but desire to plead guilty. This rule is particularly 
important in those districts in which considerable intervals occur be-
tween sessions of the grand jury. In many districts where the grand 
jury meets infrequently a defendant unable to give bail and desiring 
to plead guilty is compelled to spend many days, and sometimes many 
weeks, and even months, in jail before he can begin the service of his 
sentence, whatever it may be, awaiting the action of a grand jury. 
ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, NOTES TO THE RULES 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
reprinted in 7 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 244, 244. 
 216. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, NOTES TO THE 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, reprinted in 7 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 245. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. The Note to Rule 7(b) also pointed out that “[t]he Federal Juvenile 
Delinquency Act now permits a juvenile charged with an offense not punish-
able by death or life imprisonment to consent to prosecution by information on 
a charge of juvenile delinquency.” Id. at 244. See generally Recent Statutes, 38 
COLUM. L. REV. 1318 (1938) (discussing the constitutionality of the Federal 
Juvenile Delinquency Act). 
 219. See SURRENCY, supra note 62, at 283; Tom C. Clark, An Indorsement 
of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 305, 306 (1946) (describing a 
case in which a federal defendant in New Mexico—where the grand jury sits 
only twice a year—was arrested just following a grand jury session and saved 
himself six months in jail by waiving indictment under the new Rule 7(b) and 
FAIRFAX_4FMT 12/22/2006 11:01:15 AM 
448 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:398 
 
Rule 7(b) represented a triumph of the anti-grand jury, 
criminal law reform, and, ultimately, the legal realist efforts of 
the early twentieth century to adapt criminal procedure to the 
realities of the time. Despite the well-established “jurisdictional 
heritage” of the federal grand jury, these reformers were able—
without having to amend the Constitution—to remove a key 
obstacle to the more efficient disposition of criminal cases. In 
doing so, the reformers were able to further their efforts to 
eradicate the tendency of adjudicatory criminal procedure “to 
worship form at the expense of justice.”220 However, in the case 
of the relationship between grand jury indictment and jurisdic-
tion, the formalism of the nineteenth century discarded by 
these pro-waiver efforts concerned not mere antiquated judge-
made procedure, but the perceived mandate of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause. 
IV.  TOWARD RECONCILIATION OF THE 
JURISDICTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE  
GRAND JURY AND ITS MODERN ROLE   
This Article has sought to critique the modern understand-
ing of the right to grand jury indictment for its unjustified dis-
missal of the grand jury’s jurisdictional heritage, which was ob-
scured—but not countered—by the criminal procedural reform 
movement of the early twentieth century. Although the issue of 
constitutionality and jurisdiction was glossed over in the rule-
making process of the 1940s, the waiver provision was widely 
perceived both as efficient and as protecting defendants against 
periods of uncharged detention,221 and the constitutional objec-
tions raised during the rulemaking process eventually melted 
away.222 
The question remains: why is this important? What does it 
matter that nineteenth century courts saw grand jury indict-
ment as a jurisdictional prerequisite? Perhaps we have received 
 
describing a case in Massachusetts that was completed in 4.5 hours); Alexan-
der Holtzoff, Changes in Federal Criminal Procedure, 6 F.R.D. 277, 279 (1947) 
(describing effective use of the rule by defendants in Wyoming, New Mexico, 
and the District of Columbia); see also Lester B. Orfield, Two Years of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, 21 TEMP. L.Q. 299, 310 (1948) (“The provi-
sion for waiver has reduced the number of grand juries called in 1947, the 
number of days of service of the grand juries, and the cost to the government 
of bringing witnesses before the grand jury.”). 
 220. Perkins, supra note 125, at 300. 
 221. See supra Part III.B. 
 222. See SURRENCY, supra note 62, at 203. 
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all we can expect from the Court on this question. Presumably, 
the Supreme Court could have chosen not to acquiesce in the 
promulgation of Rule 7 in 1946, or it could have chosen to use 
one of the many federal criminal cases it has heard in the past 
sixty years to strike down Rule 7 as violative of the Grand Jury 
Clause. And, indeed, a reasonable reading of Cotton and even 
other cases where the rule was cited in passing could be seen as 
an implicit endorsement of the notion that grand jury indict-
ment is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. 
So why is further consideration of these questions impor-
tant? An easy answer is that the current understanding of the 
relationship between grand jury indictment and jurisdiction is 
based on flawed history and analysis, which must be corrected. 
In addition, there is reason for concern that the criminal proce-
dure reformers were able to use the rulemaking process to side-
step a clear constitutional mandate in the name of efficiency. 
Historical accuracy and constitutional fidelity are important 
values. By themselves, they warrant an examination of how we 
arrived where we are today. But, there are additional reasons 
to explore this issue. 
First, the failure to reconcile the modern approach with the 
jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury has spawned confusion. 
Even though federal courts since the promulgation of the FRCP 
have been uniform in their uncritical acceptance of the consti-
tutionality of indictment waiver, courts have struggled with 
how to deal with defective indictments in light of the grand 
jury’s jurisdictional heritage. Second, there is some movement 
on the part of the Supreme Court to return to fundamental con-
stitutional principles and to adopt a more formalist or original-
ist approach to certain criminal procedural rights. Questions 
arise regarding whether the Court will look again to the juris-
dictional heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, and what that ex-
amination could mean for procedural efficiency tools like pre-
indictment plea bargaining. Finally, the process of examining 
and accounting for the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury 
can provide valuable insights into the role the grand jury is 
meant to play in our constitutional structure. 
A. LINGERING CONFUSION OVER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
GRAND JURY INDICTMENT AND JURISDICTION, AND THE 
CONTINUED VITALITY OF BAIN 
Although the Rule 7 waiver debate had been all but con-
ceded by the second half of the twentieth century, the continu-
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ing vitality of Bain and its progeny has been apparent in mod-
ern judicial decisions. Perhaps due to the specious nature of the 
constitutional rationale for the waiver provision, the grand 
jury’s jurisdictional heritage continues to live on as both the 
Supreme Court and lower courts continue to recognize—
through their treatment of forfeited claims related to fatally 
flawed indictments—that there remains some nexus between 
grand jury indictment and a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
a criminal matter. The Court, in Cotton, vastly overstated the 
case when it said that Bain had been disproved by later cases 
in the twentieth century. Indeed, aside from the reform-driven 
promulgation of Rule 7 and a decision that narrowed Bain in 
the context of proof and pleading questions,223 Bain and the ju-
risdictional heritage it represented were alive and well at the 
time Cotton was decided.224 
In 1960, the Supreme Court, in Stirone v. United States, 
was presented with the question of whether a defendant can be 
convicted on allegations that, though closely related to those in 
the indictment, were not themselves charged.225 The Court said 
of Bain: “The Bain case, which has never been disapproved, 
stands for the rule that a court cannot permit a defendant to be 
tried on charges that are not made in the indictment against 
him.”226 Two years later, in Russell v. United States, the Court 
again seemed to confirm the vitality of Bain as a general mat-
ter, describing the case as the “settled rule in the federal courts 
that an indictment may not be amended except by resubmis-
sion to the grand jury, unless the change is merely a matter of 
form.”227 Although the Court again had no occasion in Russell 
to address the issue of the constitutionality of waiver, it quoted 
with approval Bain’s description of the Grand Jury Clause’s 
 
 223. The 1985 case of United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130 (1985), partly 
overruled Ex parte Bain: “To the extent Bain stands for the proposition that it 
constitutes an unconstitutional amendment to drop from an indictment those 
allegations that are unnecessary to an offense that is clearly contained with it, 
that case has simply not survived. To avoid further confusion, we now explic-
itly reject that proposition.” Id. at 144. 
 224. Indeed, during oral argument in the Cotton case, Justice Ginsburg ac-
knowledged that “it isn’t [clear] in our cases so far, that the kind of error, 
whatever it is, doesn’t qualify as, quote, jurisdictional.” Transcript of Oral Ar-
gument at 8, United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (No. 01-687), avail-
able at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument_transcripts/ 
01-687.pdf. 
 225. 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960).  
 226. Id. at 217. 
 227. 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962). 
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“‘prerequisite of an indictment’” as “‘the restriction which the 
Constitution places upon the power of the court.’”228 
Aside from never being fully overturned by the Supreme 
Court prior to Cotton, Bain and the jurisdictional heritage it 
represents were regularly relied upon by lower federal courts 
exploring the impact of indictment defects upon their jurisdic-
tion in criminal cases. A review of the cases leading up to the 
Cotton decision provides compelling evidence that the jurisdic-
tional heritage of the grand jury was being recognized even at 
the turn of the twenty-first century. The federal reporters are 
replete with cases throughout the latter half of the twentieth 
century, relying upon Bain and reaffirming its central premise 
that a valid grand jury indictment is a mandatory prerequisite 
to a court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over a crimi-
nal case.229 Even while acknowledging the waivability of the 
right to grand jury indictment under Rule 7, courts subscribed 
to the view that “‘the lack of an indictment in a (federal) felony 
case is a defect going to the jurisdiction of the court.’”230 
Following the 1999 Apprendi decision, appellate courts 
were flummoxed by the question of whether an Apprendi error 
in a federal indictment affected a court’s jurisdiction. Some 
courts, such as the Tenth Circuit, rejected the notion that an 
indictment failing to include all the elements of an offense was 
jurisdictional in nature.231 Other courts, including the Fourth 
 
 228. Id. (quoting Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 13 (1887), overruled by United 
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002)). 
 229. See, e.g., Crosby v. United States, 339 F.2d 743, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1964) 
(“The scope of the indictment goes to the existence of the trial court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction.” (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 12–13; Stirone, 361 
U.S. at 213.)); see also United States v. Montgomery, 628 F.2d 414, 416 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (“‘Unless there is a valid waiver, the lack of an indictment in a (fed-
eral) felony case is a defect going to the jurisdiction of the court.’” (quoting 
WRIGHT, supra note 54, § 121, at 522)); United States v. Macklin, 523 F.2d 
193, 196 (2d Cir. 1975) (“The absence of an indictment is a jurisdictional defect 
which deprives the court of its power to act.” (citing Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 
417 (1885); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1)); United States v. Choate, 276 F.2d 724, 
728 (5th Cir. 1960) (“[L]ack of indictment goes to the court’s jurisdiction.”); 
Colson v. Smith, 315 F. Supp. 179, 182 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (noting that lack of in-
dictment deprives the court of jurisdiction while uncritically acknowledging 
the validity of indictment waiver); United States v. Anzelmo, 319 F. Supp. 
1106, 1125 (E.D. La. 1970) (referring to jurisdiction). 
 230. Montgomery, 628 F.2d at 416 (quoting WRIGHT, supra note 54, § 121, 
at 213). 
 231. See United States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 981 (10th Cir. 2001). But 
see United States v. Tran, 234 F.3d 798, 808–09 (2d Cir. 2000) (limiting the 
scope of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to an offense charged in the in-
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Circuit, held squarely that a valid grand jury indictment was a 
mandatory prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction under 
Bain and its progeny.232 Still other courts were divided on the 
question; the Eleventh Circuit had a split panel with two 
judges holding that “the constitutional right to be charged by 
grand jury indictment simply does not fit the mold of a jurisdic-
tional defect, because it is a right that plainly may be waived” 
under Rule 7,233 while a third judge on the same panel asserted 
that “an indictment found by a grand jury [i]s indispensable to 
the power of the court to try [the defendant] for the crime with 
which he was charged.”234 
Lest anyone take false comfort from the Cotton Court’s 
flawed historical analysis, the fact remains that Bain has re-
tained its vitality. The Court never definitively resolved the 
constitutionality of waiver of indictment. The reformers were 
able to establish waivability of indictment through the rule-
making process and by making arguments about efficiency, but 
the core view that there is a relationship between grand jury 
indictment and jurisdiction lived on in other contexts right up 
until the Supreme Court decided Cotton. Due to the uncertain 
foundation of the waiver rule and the failure of the Court to 
address directly the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury, 
confusion lingers—confusion that obscures our understanding 
of the role of the grand jury. 
B. REALISM AND FORMALISM, PRAGMATISM AND ORIGINALISM 
It is necessary, therefore, to reconcile, in a principled and 
reasoned way, the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury with 
our desire for efficiency in the criminal process. By sweeping 
this jurisdictional heritage under the rug, the reformers and 
the Supreme Court have failed to take into account the in-
tended role of grand jury indictment in our system. A more 
comprehensive understanding might lead to consideration of 
 
dictment), overruled by United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655 (2nd Cir. 2001). 
 232. See United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 404 (4th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 
535 U.S. 625 (2002); see also United States v. Longoria, 259 F.3d 363, 365 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (“The grand jury’s issuance of an indictment is what gives federal 
courts jurisdiction to hear a case and impose a sentence.”), rev’d en banc, 298 
F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2002) (reversing course after the decision in Cotton). 
 233. See McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1249 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 234. See id. at 1263 (Barkett, J., concurring in result only) (“‘[A]n indict-
ment found by a grand jury [i]s indispensable to the power of the court to try 
[the defendant] for the crime with which he was charged.’” (quoting Ex parte 
Bain, 121 U.S. at 12–13) (second and third alterations in original)). 
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how to make the grand jury a more robust protection of indi-
vidual liberty as well as an effective tool for the investigation of 
criminal activity. By avoiding the question of how to reconcile 
the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury with the modern 
quest for criminal procedural efficiency, the rulemakers and 
the Supreme Court have left the grand jury requirement in le-
gal limbo. If it is not a jurisdictional requirement, what is it? If 
it is a jurisdictional requirement, how is waiver constitutional? 
It might seem that the promulgation of Rule 7 represented 
the triumph of realism over formalism, and that the realist 
criminal procedural reform project succeeded in sidestepping 
the constitutional issue, thereby demeaning the grand jury and 
rejecting it as a fundamental protector of liberty. Recent cases 
have demonstrated, however, that the Supreme Court some-
times returns to the origins of constitutional provisions and to 
fundamental principles.235 A future Supreme Court might be 
persuaded to return to formalism or originalism in determining 
whether the right to grand jury indictment is of jurisdictional 
import. 
Cotton, to be sure, was a pragmatic decision—both in the 
way it echoed the legal realist view of the grand jury right and 
because of its conscious avoidance of the havoc that a contrary 
decision would have wreaked in the short term, given the un-
certainty surrounding the implications of the Apprendi deci-
sion.236 The Court undoubtedly was concerned about the impact 
that the contrary conclusion—that grand jury indictment was, 
indeed, a mandatory prerequisite to a court’s exercise of juris-
diction over a criminal case—would have had on the admini-
stration of criminal justice in the federal courts. Fearing an 
avalanche of similar challenges to sentences under indictments 
that did not charge the crime for which the defendant was sen-
 
 235. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); Blakeley v. 
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 236. See, e.g., Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Crimi-
nal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922, 948–50 (2006). For a definition of legal pragma-
tism (and a comment on some difficulties in defining it), see RICHARD POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW 11–15 (1995). See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIB-
ERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); RICHARD POS-
NER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY (2003); Daniel A. Farber, Legal 
Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Richard A. 
Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996). 
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tenced, the Court may have felt compelled to preserve appellate 
courts’ ability to apply plain error or harmless error review.237 
However, a truly profound—if unintended—consequence 
would have been the concomitant weakening of the foundation 
of pre-indictment plea bargaining. To re-open the question of 
whether grand jury indictment can be waived without divesting 
a court of jurisdiction might have meant the beginning of the 
end of federal pre-indictment guilty pleas. Over ninety percent 
of convictions in adjudicated criminal cases in federal district 
courts come by way of guilty plea.238 Elimination of the avail-
ability of pre-indictment pleas, although only a subset of that 
number, would negatively impact the ability of the federal dis-
trict courts to process the more than sixty-seven thousand 
criminal case filings each year.239 
In this way, Cotton can be read as the pragmatic recogni-
tion of the same concerns that animated the realist project’s at-
tack on the grand jury. The view that the right to grand jury 
indictment is nothing more than a personal privilege of the 
criminal defendant, unrelated to structural considerations, is 
certainly a common thread. Practical concerns of efficiency un-
dergird the modern understanding just as they did the realist 
reform project. Driven by pragmatic concerns about Apprendi 
challenges to indictments like the one the Court faced in that 
case, and, perhaps, the broader and more calamitous problem 
of potential challenges to pre-indictment guilty pleas, the Cot-
ton Court made a weak argument against the jurisdictional 
heritage of the grand jury, based upon revisionist historical 
evidence and flawed reasoning. 
 
 237. A fair argument can be made that the pro-jurisdictional heritage deci-
sion may have had minimal impact for purposes of Apprendi-type indictment 
errors. First, federal prosecutors responded immediately to Apprendi by in-
cluding sentencing enhancement facts in grand jury indictments, thus making 
the indictments immune to the type of challenge pressed in the Cotton case. 
Second, at least in its early refinements, Booker, the case which ultimately 
applied Apprendi’s core teaching in the federal context, does not require grand 
jury indictments to include sentencing factors, although a careful prosecutor 
might include them anyway. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 761–62; id. at 780 n.10 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); 2 BEALE, supra note 35, § 8.1 (noting that recent 
precedent may require prosecutors to include aggravating factors in their in-
dictments). 
 238. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in 
Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 96 (2005); Federal Justice 
Statistics, Summary Findings, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fed.htm# 
Adjudication. 
 239. See, e.g., Judicial Business of the United States Courts (2002), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/d00sep02.pdf. 
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The danger in the Court’s pragmatic approach displayed in 
Cotton is that it may have begun to give way to an originalist 
approach in a closely-related area of criminal procedure.240 Re-
cent scholarship has highlighted the ways in which a majority 
of the Court has been persuaded to apply an originalist and 
formalist approach in the area of criminal procedural rights.241 
Whether a trend is afoot is debatable.242 In any event, the will-
ingness of a majority of the Rehnquist (now Roberts) Court to 
apply originalist approaches to constitutional criminal proce-
dural protections is certainly worth recognition. Should the 
originalist approach extend to the grand jury context, a future 
court may be inclined to re-examine the question of whether 
the grand jury right is a jurisdictional prerequisite such that 
waiver of indictment or allowing fatal defects to the indictment 
would unconstitutionally violate the Grand Jury Clause.243 
 
 240. For some attempts to define the contours of originalism, see ROBERT 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
133–267 (1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 37–47 
(1997); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L.J. 1, 20–35 (1971); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 
U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 851–65 (1989). See also 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 47; Law-
rence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997); Law-
rence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). 
 241. See Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Proce-
dure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defen-
dants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 184 (2005); Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, 
and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.1043 (forth-
coming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=910563. 
 242. Professor Bibas points out that the use of originalism in one of the two 
cases he examines, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), in applying 
the Apprendi logic to state sentencing guidelines, was not as straightforward 
as might appear on the surface. Bibas observes that, in Blakely, the record 
was anything but definitive with regard to the history of the Article III and 
Sixth Amendment Jury Clauses. See Bibas, supra note 241, at 195–96. Also, 
Bibas notes that a true fidelity to originalism in Blakely settled for “half an 
originalist loaf” by leaving intact waiver of jury trial which, although essential 
to modern day plea bargaining, fairly clearly contravenes the mandate of the 
Jury Clause of Article III. See id. at 197. 
 243. An originalist resort to text and history may very well lead to the con-
clusion that the fulfillment of the right to grand jury indictment is a manda-
tory jurisdictional prerequisite that would make, for example, pre-indictment 
plea bargaining unconstitutional much like a true originalist approach to the 
right to jury trial would render all plea bargaining unconstitutional. Bain, the 
decision standing for the proposition that the Grand Jury Clause is a jurisdic-
tional mandate, has been described as a quintessential originalist decision: 
It is never to be forgotten that, in the construction of the language of 
the Constitution here relied on, as, indeed in all other instances 
where construction becomes necessary, we are to place ourselves as 
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Given the clear and undeniable evidence of the jurisdic-
tional heritage of the grand jury and the questionable constitu-
tional rationale for the indictment waiver provision, the mod-
ern understanding is inadequate and must be revisited. 
Precisely because plea-bargaining is a necessity in our federal 
criminal justice system, for example, it is imperative that it 
rest upon a firmer constitutional foundation than that which 
the Court has supplied. In addition, although Booker on its face 
does not compel federal prosecutors to include enhancement 
factors in indictments,244 this view could change, and the Court 
and lower courts reviewing indictment challenges on that basis 
would be forced again to come to grips with Cotton’s weak ra-
tionale. Furthermore, unanticipated developments in the rec-
ognition of criminal procedural rights could expose the soft un-
derbelly of the Court’s approach.245 
 
nearly as possible in the condition of men who framed that instru-
ment. Undoubtedly the framers of this article had for a long time 
been absorbed in considering the arbitrary encroachments of the 
crown on the liberty of the subject, and were imbued with the com-
mon-law estimate of the value of the grand jury as part of its system 
of criminal jurisprudence. They, therefore, must be understood to 
have used the language which they did in declaring that no person 
should be called to answer for any capital or otherwise infamous 
crime, except upon an indictment or presentment of a grand jury, in 
the full sense of its necessity and of its value. 
Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887), overruled by United States v. Cotton, 535 
U.S. 625 (2002); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A 
Critical Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 30–31 
(1994); Kevin C. Newsom, Setting Incorporation Straight: A Reinterpretation of 
the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 696 (2000). An interesting 
query is why the Cotton decision earned the vote of Justice Scalia. Possible ex-
planations are that Scalia was of the mind that a contrary result was not re-
quired by an originalist approach—the text and history of the Grand Jury 
Clause do not provide sufficient certainty to warrant the conclusion that grand 
jury indictment is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Another possibility is that, in 
the words of Professor Bibas, there was no “half an originalist loaf” to take 
from Cotton, and the full loaf—which arguably would entail abolishment of all 
waiver of grand jury indictment, including pre-indictment plea bargaining—
was far too expensive. Bibas, supra note 241, at 197. 
 244. See supra Part I. 
 245. This Article is not a general call for an originalist approach to inter-
preting criminal procedural protections in the Constitution. However, we must 
ensure that our historical understanding of these protections is sound as we 
interpret and apply them to our modern situation. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, 
What Did the Framers Know and When Did They Know It? Fictional Original-
ism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 107 (2005) (disputing 
the Court’s characterization of the “original meaning of the Confrontation 
Clause”). Also, it is, to say the least, a good idea to get questions of jurisdiction 
correct. Because limits on a court’s power to entertain a case serve a number 
of important functions in our constitutional democracy—such as separation of 
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Therefore, it makes sense to determine whether a more 
dynamic interpretation of the Grand Jury Clause’s mandate 
might yield the same result as the pragmatic approach, but, at 
the same time, respect the jurisdictional heritage of the grand 
jury and the implications that history has for the way we can 
improve it today. 
C. LESSONS LOST, LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
Aside from the lingering confusion and the vulnerability of 
the modern understanding is the fact that the grand jury as an 
institution could benefit from a thorough consideration of its in-
tended role in the constitutional system. To discard the juris-
dictional heritage as mere historical novelty in order to reap 
practical benefits would be to ignore over a century of jurispru-
dence rich with guidance for re-examining what the modern 
grand jury could and should be and how it could and should 
best serve our democracy. 
If the grand jury protection was important enough to be en-
forced through a restriction on the judicial power, what does 
that tell us about the effectiveness of the grand jury today? 
Have we allowed the grand jury to stray so far from its sup-
posed function that the Grand Jury Clause demands a correc-
tion of course? Perhaps the jurisdictional treatment of the right 
to grand jury indictment was as much about restraining prose-
cutorial power as it was about restraining judicial power. If this 
is the case, then waiver and forfeiture rules promoting effi-
ciency might be less obviously “good” than we have assumed. 
The Supreme Court adopted the pragmatic view without criti-
cal examination of the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury 
and has failed to confront the reason why the Fifth Amendment 
was written to contain a Grand Jury Clause. As a result, our 
understanding of the grand jury has suffered. 
By the end of the twentieth century, many in the American 
legal community—judges, attorneys, and scholars alike—were 
content with the illogical position that grand jury indictment is 
a mandatory prerequisite to a court’s jurisdiction, but that a de-
fendant could waive the right to grand jury indictment. Al-
though the availability of waiver of grand jury indictment may 
be desirable from an efficiency standpoint, it is of paramount 
 
powers, federalism, and individual liberty—we should be ever-vigilant to en-
sure continued fidelity to constitutional strictures. See, e.g., Howard M. 
Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 649–50, 650 n.30 
(2005). 
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importance that we obtain a firm grasp on the principles that 
define the role of both the grand jury as well as the indictment 
in the pantheon of criminal procedural rights, particularly at a 
time when the closely-related right to a jury trial is enjoying a 
new vitality. The Court’s uncritical acceptance of the pragmatic 
approach has squandered the opportunity to critically examine 
and to clarify the relationship between the grand jury and ju-
risdiction. Much work remains to be done. The acknowledge-
ment of the grand jury’s “jurisdictional heritage” is an impor-
tant first step in the long-overdue project of taking inventory of 
the grand jury and its place in the constitutional framework of 
our criminal justice system. 
  CONCLUSION   
The modern rejection of the grand jury’s jurisdictional 
heritage is largely without basis. Once we move beyond the fic-
tion that the grand jury has no jurisdictional significance, a 
number of interesting questions emerge. How do we square 
that robust view of grand jury indictment with the non-
incorporation of the grand jury right to the states, and should 
that question be revisited? Does the jurisdictional heritage of 
the grand jury place any restrictions on the extent to which we 
can implement much-needed reforms to the grand jury? Does it 
mandate that we implement reforms that make the grand jury 
a more effective protection of individual rights? 
In this age when the institution of the grand jury has lost 
the respect of much of the legal profession and, perhaps, the 
citizenry, it may be difficult to imagine the grand jury as a ro-
bust jurisdictional prerequisite to the exercise of federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction. To be sure, the jurisdictional heritage of the 
grand jury has been obscured by twentieth century pragmatic 
efforts at criminal procedural reform; however, it has never 
been sufficiently disproved. 
A far superior approach would acknowledge the jurisdic-
tional significance of the grand jury and balance it against 
practical considerations in a way that enhances both efficiency 
and liberty. Rather than sweeping under the rug for practical 
purposes the relationship between the grand jury and jurisdic-
tion, we need to reclaim that heritage and determine how it 
might help us decipher the role the grand jury is supposed to 
play in our constitutional system and what might be done, in 
compliance with the Constitution, to enhance the quality of 
criminal justice in the United States. 
